Constitution of India
Article 96: The Speaker or the Deputy Speaker not to preside while a resolution for his removal from office is under consideration
Part V — The Union, Chapter II — Parliament
Clause (1)
WHAT IT SAYS: When a resolution for removing the Speaker is under consideration, the Speaker shall not preside; when a resolution for removing the Deputy Speaker is under consideration, the Deputy Speaker shall not preside — and Article 95(2) provisions (panel of chairpersons) shall apply as if the Speaker/Deputy Speaker were absent. WHAT IT MEANS: The concerned presiding officer is barred from chairing the House during his own removal proceedings; another person determined under the rules of procedure presides instead. KEY DOCTRINE: Nemo judex in causa sua — no one shall be a judge in their own cause; prevents conflict of interest in removal proceedings.
Clause (2)
WHAT IT SAYS: The Speaker retains the right to speak in, participate in, and vote in the first instance on the removal resolution or any other matter during such proceedings — but CANNOT exercise a casting vote in case of equality of votes (notwithstanding Article 100). WHAT IT MEANS: The Speaker is treated as an ordinary member (not as presiding officer) — can defend himself and vote normally, but loses the tie-breaking casting vote privilege under Article 100. KEY DOCTRINE: Audi alteram partem (right to be heard) — balanced with the nemo judex principle; ensures fair hearing without giving the Speaker decisive control over the outcome.
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. British Parliamentary Convention (House of Commons) — Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice Original provision: By convention, the UK Speaker is expected to act with impartiality; removal is governed by address/resolution, though the UK has no specific constitutional bar on the Speaker presiding during such proceedings. What India kept: India codified the principle of the Speaker not presiding over own removal proceedings into a written constitutional provision. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Written constitutional bar — Unlike the UK convention-based approach, India made it a binding constitutional mandate (Article 96) that the Speaker/Deputy Speaker CANNOT preside during removal proceedings. 2. Right to vote in first instance — India uniquely allows the Speaker to vote as an ordinary member during removal proceedings, but specifically strips the casting vote power under Article 100. 3. Analogous provision for Rajya Sabha — Article 92 creates a parallel provision for the Chairman/Deputy Chairman of the Council of States, showing India's systematic application across both Houses. IF ORIGINAL INDIAN CONTRIBUTION: The framers felt the need to constitutionally codify the nemo judex principle for presiding officers because India's written Constitution, unlike the UK's unwritten one, required explicit safeguards to ensure fairness and prevent abuse in a newly democratic polity.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 19 May 1949 (CAD Volume VIII) KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Shri T.T. Krishnamachari (Drafting Committee member) — Introduced Draft Article 78-A and stated it was analogous to Draft Article 75-A (now Article 92) which dealt with the same principle for the Chairman/Deputy Chairman of the Council of States. 2. Dr. Rajendra Prasad (President of the Assembly) — Presided over the session and put the motion to vote. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. None — There was no further debate after T.T. Krishnamachari introduced the provision. The article was adopted without any opposition or discussion. FINAL OUTCOME: Draft Article 78-A was adopted without debate on 19 May 1949; the Drafting Committee introduced it as an amendment since it was NOT part of the original Draft Constitution of 1948. AMBEDKAR'S KEY QUOTE (if available): No direct quote from Ambedkar on this specific article — it was moved by T.T. Krishnamachari who noted: "this new article is exactly the same in content as article 75-A which the House was good enough to accept."
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. Nabam Rebia & Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker (2016) — SC held that a Speaker facing a pending removal notice is disabled from deciding disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law), extending the spirit of Article 96 to bar the Speaker from exercising quasi-judicial functions when his own position is in question. 2. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) — SC upheld the Tenth Schedule's validity and affirmed the Speaker's institutional impartiality, calling the Speaker 'the very embodiment of propriety and impartiality', indirectly reinforcing Article 96's foundational principle. 3. Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023) — SC's Constitution Bench revisited the Nabam Rebia ratio in the Maharashtra political crisis context, observing that the Nabam Rebia verdict 'requires gap filling to uphold constitutional morality' regarding Speaker's powers during pending removal notices. NOTABLE DISSENTS (if any): 1. None directly on Article 96, but in Nabam Rebia (2016), Justice J. Chelameswar wrote a partially dissenting opinion on the broader constitutional issues (Governor's powers), though the 5-judge bench was unanimous on the Speaker-related holding. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. M.P. Jain — Notes that Article 96 is a constitutional embodiment of the nemo judex in causa sua principle applied to legislative presiding officers. 2. D.D. Basu — Observes that Article 96 balances two principles: preventing conflict of interest (Clause 1) and ensuring right to defence (Clause 2), reflecting constitutional fairness in parliamentary governance.