Constitution of India
Article 92: The Chairman or the Deputy Chairman not to preside while a resolution for his removal from office is under consideration
Part V — The Union
Clause (1)
WHAT IT SAYS: When a resolution for removal of the Vice-President (Chairman) or Deputy Chairman is under consideration in the Rajya Sabha, the concerned officer shall not preside, even if present — and Article 91(2) provisions for alternate presiding shall apply. WHAT IT MEANS: The Chairman or Deputy Chairman is barred from the Chair during his own removal debate; the Deputy Chairman (or a member under rules of procedure) presides instead. KEY DOCTRINE: Nemo judex in causa sua — no person shall be a judge in his own cause.
Clause (2)
WHAT IT SAYS: The Chairman retains the right to speak and participate in Rajya Sabha proceedings during a resolution for removal of the Vice-President, but — notwithstanding Article 100 — shall NOT be entitled to vote at all on such resolution or any other matter during such proceedings. WHAT IT MEANS: The Chairman may defend himself orally but has zero voting rights during the entire removal proceedings — not even a first-instance vote. KEY DOCTRINE: Audi alteram partem (right to be heard) balanced with total voting disqualification. NOTE: This differs from Article 96(2) for Lok Sabha Speaker, who CAN vote in the first instance but not on a tie.
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. British Parliamentary Convention — Westminster practice of the Speaker not presiding during motions concerning his own removal. Original provision: Conventional (unwritten) rule that the Speaker recuses from the Chair when a motion for his removal is moved. What India kept: Codified the convention into a written constitutional provision, making it a binding rule rather than mere convention. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Written constitutional mandate instead of unwritten convention — India chose to constitutionalise this principle because nascent democratic institutions needed firm rules, not just traditions. 2. Complete voting bar for Chairman under Clause (2) — Unlike Article 96(2) for the Lok Sabha Speaker (who can vote in first instance), the Chairman of Rajya Sabha cannot vote at all during removal proceedings, because the Chairman (Vice-President) is not an elected member of the House. 3. Cross-reference to Article 91(2) for alternate presiding arrangements — Ensures no procedural vacuum by mandating a substitute presider through rules of procedure.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 19 May 1949 (CAD Volume VIII) KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Shri T.T. Krishnamachari (Madras) — Moved the new Draft Article 75-A, explaining it was needed to overcome the technical difficulty arising during removal proceedings of Chairman/Deputy Chairman. 2. Shri H.V. Kamath (C.P. & Berar) — Pointed out a lacuna: the article barred the Chairman from presiding but did not explicitly say who would preside instead. 3. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Bombay) — Clarified there was no lacuna: if Chairman is being tried, Deputy Chairman presides; if Deputy Chairman is being tried, Chairman presides; if both unavailable, Article 91(2) rules of procedure apply. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Lacuna in alternate presiding — H.V. Kamath argued the article should explicitly name an alternative presiding officer; Ambedkar rejected this as unnecessary since Article 91(2) already provided the mechanism. FINAL OUTCOME: The Constituent Assembly adopted Draft Article 75-A without any amendments on 19 May 1949. AMBEDKAR'S KEY QUOTE: "No such difficulty as has been pointed out by Mr. Kamath is likely to arise, and there is, I submit, no lacuna whatsoever."
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) — The Supreme Court held that presiding officers like Speakers/Chairmen are expected to act as the 'very embodiment of propriety and impartiality,' reflecting the spirit underlying Article 92. 2. No direct Supreme Court ruling exclusively on Article 92 exists — courts have recognised the broader principle of neutrality of presiding officers during removal proceedings as embedded in Articles 92 and 96. NOTABLE DISSENTS (if any): 1. Justices L.M. Sharma & J.S. Verma in Kihoto Hollohan (1992) — Dissented that the Speaker, whose tenure depends on majority support, cannot be considered a truly impartial adjudicatory authority. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. D.D. Basu — Noted that Article 92 embodies the fundamental principle of natural justice (nemo judex in causa sua) within the parliamentary framework. 2. M.P. Jain — Observed that Article 92 ensures procedural integrity by preventing any conflict of interest during the sensitive process of removal of presiding officers of Rajya Sabha.