Constitution of India
Article 85: Sessions of Parliament, Prorogation and Dissolution
Part V — The Union (Chapter II — Parliament)
Clause (1) — Summoning of Parliament
WHAT IT SAYS: The President shall from time to time summon each House of Parliament to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. The President holds the formal power to summon both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. 2. Parliament must meet at least twice a year — no gap of more than 6 months between sessions. 3. In practice, the President acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers (Article 74). KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Minimum Parliamentary Sessions — the 6-month rule is a constitutional safeguard against executive attempts to avoid legislative accountability.
Clause (2)(a) — Prorogation of Houses
WHAT IT SAYS: The President may from time to time prorogue the Houses or either House. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. Prorogation = formal termination of a session of Parliament by the President. 2. It ends the session but does NOT dissolve the House. 3. After prorogation, all pending notices, motions, and resolutions lapse — but Bills do NOT lapse. 4. Prorogation is distinct from adjournment (which is by the Presiding Officer and is a temporary pause within a session). KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Lapse — pending business (except Bills) lapses upon prorogation; differentiates prorogation from adjournment.
Clause (2)(b) — Dissolution of House of the People
WHAT IT SAYS: The President may from time to time dissolve the House of the People (Lok Sabha). WHAT IT MEANS: 1. Only the Lok Sabha can be dissolved — Rajya Sabha is a permanent House and cannot be dissolved. 2. Dissolution ends the life of the existing Lok Sabha — fresh general elections must follow. 3. Two types: (a) Automatic — when the 5-year term expires (Article 83); (b) Premature — on the advice of the Prime Minister. 4. Upon dissolution, all Bills pending in Lok Sabha lapse; Bills pending in Rajya Sabha that have NOT been passed by Lok Sabha survive. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Pleasure and Responsible Government — dissolution power ensures democratic renewal and maintains the executive's accountability to the electorate.
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. Government of India Act, 1935 — Section 19 (Federal Legislature) and Section 62 (Provincial Legislature) Original provision: Section 19 required the Federal Legislature to be summoned once a year with 12 months maximum gap; the Governor-General could summon, prorogue, and dissolve at his discretion. What India kept: The structure of summoning, prorogation, and dissolution; the concept of a mandatory minimum gap between sessions. 2. British Parliamentary Convention (Westminster Model) Original provision: The Crown formally summons and prorogues Parliament as a royal prerogative. What India kept: The President as formal head summons and prorogues Parliament, mirroring the Crown's role. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Reduced the gap from 12 months (1935 Act) to 6 months — to ensure more frequent legislative sessions in a newly independent democracy. 2. President acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers (Article 74) — unlike the Governor-General who acted in his discretion under the 1935 Act. 3. Dissolution applies only to Lok Sabha — Rajya Sabha was designed as a permanent body unlike the Council of State under the 1935 Act. 4. The original 1950 text required Parliament to meet 'twice at least in every year' — the First Amendment (1951) restructured the wording but retained the 6-month gap rule.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 18 May 1949 (CAD Volume VIII) Draft Article number: Article 69 KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Prof. K.T. Shah — Proposed reducing 'six months' to 'three months' to ensure more frequent sessions; also proposed that if the President fails to summon Parliament within 90 days, the Speaker/Chairman should be able to convene the House. 2. Shri H.V. Kamath — Moved an amendment to replace 'twice' with 'thrice', arguing the Drafting Committee had mindlessly copied the provision from the Government of India Act, 1935. 3. Shri R.K. Sidhwa — Advocated for year-round parliamentary sessions akin to the British Parliament. 4. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Chairman, Drafting Committee) — Opposed all amendments for more frequent sessions, arguing the provision only sets a minimum floor and does not prohibit Parliament from meeting more often. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Frequency of sessions — K.T. Shah and Kamath wanted 3 sessions per year as a constitutional mandate; Ambedkar felt this was unnecessary. 2. Safeguard against Presidential inaction — K.T. Shah proposed Speaker/Chairman should summon Parliament if President fails; Ambedkar considered this unnecessary, stating failure to summon would itself be a ground for impeachment. FINAL OUTCOME: All amendments were rejected; the Draft Article 69 was adopted as-is on 18 May 1949. AMBEDKAR'S KEY QUOTE: The provision merely ensures minimum parliamentary sittings; he believed Parliament would meet so often that members would 'probably themselves get tired of the sessions'.
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. Keshav Singh v. Speaker, Legislative Assembly, U.P. (1965) — Supreme Court emphasised the importance of regular parliamentary sessions as a core component of legislative accountability and constitutional governance. 2. State of U.P. v. Raj Narain (1975) — Court examined the procedural implications of prorogation, underscoring it as a formal act of closure that maintains the rhythm of parliamentary business. 3. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — While primarily on Article 356, the 9-judge bench observed that dissolution/prorogation powers under Article 85 (and its state equivalent Article 174) are not immune from judicial review when exercised mala fide; prorogation/dissolution done under Article 85 is generally not justiciable but constitutional limits apply. 4. Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) — Though on Article 174 (state equivalent of Article 85), the 5-judge bench held that the Governor cannot summon, prorogue, or dissolve the Assembly without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers; this ratio applies analogously to the President's power under Article 85. NOTABLE DISSENTS (if any): 1. None recorded specifically on Article 85 interpretation; however, dissents in S.R. Bommai (1994) touched on the extent of judicial review over executive discretion in dissolution matters. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. D.D. Basu — Article 85 prevents the executive from governing without Parliament; the 6-month rule is a constitutional check against executive autocracy. 2. M.P. Jain — The power to dissolve Lok Sabha is a crucial instrument of responsible government, enabling the electorate to serve as the final arbiter when political deadlocks arise.