Constitution of India
Article 75: Other provisions as to Ministers
Part V — The Union (Chapter I — The Executive)
Clause (1) — Appointment of PM and Ministers
WHAT IT SAYS: The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President; other Ministers shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. President has no discretion in choosing other Ministers — must follow PM's advice. 2. PM is the real executive authority; President is the nominal/ceremonial head. 3. In practice, PM selects the Cabinet; President merely formalises the appointment. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Pleasure — Ministers serve at the President's pleasure but are effectively chosen by the PM.
Clause (1A) — Cap on Council Size [Inserted by 91st Amendment Act, 2003]
WHAT IT SAYS: Total number of Ministers including the PM shall not exceed 15% of the total membership of Lok Sabha. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. With Lok Sabha strength of 543, maximum ministers can be approximately 81. 2. Prevents bloated Cabinets created to buy political loyalty. 3. Inserted to curb horse-trading and political instability from oversized ministries. KEY DOCTRINE: Anti-defection and good governance reform — limits executive overexpansion.
Clause (1B) — Disqualification of Defectors [Inserted by 91st Amendment Act, 2003]
WHAT IT SAYS: A member of either House disqualified under Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection) is also disqualified from being appointed as a Minister for the remaining term. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. A defector cannot be rewarded with a ministerial berth. 2. Disqualification lasts from the date of defection until the term expires or they are re-elected. 3. Strengthens the anti-defection law originally enacted via 52nd Amendment (1985). KEY DOCTRINE: Anti-Defection Doctrine (Tenth Schedule) — defectors barred from holding executive office.
Clause (2) — Tenure of Ministers
WHAT IT SAYS: Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. In practice, 'pleasure of the President' means 'advice of the PM' — PM can get any Minister removed. 2. President cannot independently dismiss a Minister without PM's recommendation. 3. Gives PM disciplinary authority over the Council of Ministers. KEY DOCTRINE: Pleasure Doctrine — nominal Presidential discretion; real authority rests with the PM.
Clause (3) — Collective Responsibility
WHAT IT SAYS: The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People (Lok Sabha). WHAT IT MEANS: 1. The entire Cabinet sinks or swims together — if Lok Sabha passes a no-confidence motion, all Ministers must resign. 2. A dissenting Minister must either accept the Cabinet decision publicly or resign. 3. This is the bedrock of parliamentary democracy — the executive is accountable to the legislature. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Collective Responsibility — 'all for one, one for all' in Cabinet governance.
Clause (4) — Oath of Office and Secrecy
WHAT IT SAYS: Before entering office, the President shall administer oaths of office and secrecy to Ministers as per the Third Schedule. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. The oath form is identical for the PM and all other Ministers — no hierarchical distinction. 2. Ministers swear to uphold the Constitution and maintain secrecy of Cabinet proceedings. 3. Constitutional formality that legitimises the assumption of executive power. KEY DOCTRINE: Constitutional Oath Requirement — ensures fidelity to the Constitution before exercising power.
Clause (5) — Six-Month Membership Rule
WHAT IT SAYS: A Minister who is not a member of either House of Parliament for six consecutive months shall cease to be a Minister. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. A non-member can be appointed Minister but MUST get elected or nominated to either House within 6 months. 2. Prevents permanent 'non-elected' Ministers — ensures democratic legitimacy. 3. The Supreme Court in S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab (2001) ruled that a non-member cannot be repeatedly re-appointed as Minister to circumvent this rule. KEY DOCTRINE: Democratic Legitimacy Doctrine — ministerial power must derive from parliamentary membership.
Clause (6) — Salaries and Allowances
WHAT IT SAYS: Salaries and allowances of Ministers shall be determined by Parliament by law; until so determined, they shall be as specified in the Second Schedule. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. Parliament has full control over ministerial remuneration — ensures transparency. 2. Currently governed by the Salaries and Allowances of Ministers Act, 1952 (as amended). 3. Can be changed by simple majority — no special procedure required. KEY DOCTRINE: Parliamentary Sovereignty over Public Purse — legislature controls executive compensation.
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. United Kingdom (British Westminster Model) — Conventions of Cabinet Government Original provision: UK Cabinet system rests on unwritten conventions — PM appointed by the Crown, Ministers hold office at Crown's pleasure, collective Cabinet responsibility to the House of Commons. What India kept: India codified these conventions into written constitutional provisions (Clauses 1, 2, and 3 of Art. 75). 2. Government of India Act, 1935 — Sections 10 and 36 Original provision: Governor-General appointed Ministers who held office during his pleasure. What India kept: The framework of 'pleasure of the head of state' was retained but made subject to the parliamentary system. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Written codification of collective responsibility (Clause 3) — In the UK this is an unwritten convention; India made it a justiciable constitutional provision to prevent ambiguity in a new democracy. 2. Six-month membership requirement (Clause 5) — Absent in UK practice where Ministers can be peers or non-MPs; India required democratic legitimacy through mandatory parliamentary membership. 3. 15% cap on Council size (Clause 1A, added 2003) — No equivalent in any Westminster system; India's unique response to coalition-era problems of bloated Cabinets used for political patronage. 4. Anti-defection bar on ministerial appointment (Clause 1B, added 2003) — India's original contribution to prevent defectors from being rewarded with executive power, unique globally.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 30 December 1948, 31 December 1948, 14 October 1949, 17 October 1949 (CAD Volumes VII and X) DRAFT ARTICLE NUMBER: Draft Article 62 KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Drafting Committee Chairman) — Moved the article and an amendment mandating the President to follow the Instrument of Instructions in exercising power. 2. Prof. K.T. Shah (Bihar) — Proposed that PM must be appointed from the party commanding a majority in the People's House, to guarantee stable government. 3. Mahavir Tyagi (United Provinces) — Opposed the proposal for Cabinet election by proportional representation; supported unified Cabinet under PM's leadership. 4. Mahboob Ali Baig — Proposed that the Cabinet should be elected by the House through the single transferable vote system. 5. H.V. Kamath (C.P. & Berar) — Participated actively in procedural discussions; sought clarity on removal provisions. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Whether 'pleasure of the President' should be replaced with 'confidence of the House of People' — A member argued this would codify existing convention and prevent future ambiguity; not accepted. 2. Whether Ministers must be elected members of the House of People only — A member argued that appointing 'permanent Ministers' from nominated members would violate democratic principles; not accepted. 3. Whether PM must come from majority party — K.T. Shah's amendment to constitutionally mandate this was rejected. FINAL OUTCOME: Only the Drafting Committee Chairman's amendments were accepted; the Assembly adopted Draft Article 62 on 31 December 1948, with further revisions on 14 and 17 October 1949.
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. U.N.R. Rao v. Smt. Indira Gandhi (1971) — The SC held that the Council of Ministers must enjoy the confidence of Lok Sabha under Art. 75(3); when Lok Sabha is dissolved, collective responsibility ceases to operate. 2. Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) — A 7-judge bench held that the President and Governor are constitutional heads bound to act on the aid and advice of their Council of Ministers, reinforcing Art. 75's parliamentary framework. 3. S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda (1996) — The SC clarified that the oath under Art. 75(4) is uniform for PM and all Ministers; a non-member can be appointed PM provided they secure parliamentary membership within six months. 4. Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) — The SC observed that the PM is duty-bound to act with the highest standards of public integrity and advised against appointing Ministers facing criminal charges, though this was held to be advisory, not mandatory. 5. Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) — The SC identified parliamentary democracy and collective responsibility under Art. 75(3) as part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution, placing them beyond amendment. 6. Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. State of Maharashtra (1987) — The SC elaborated on collective responsibility, holding that each Minister is jointly responsible for all Cabinet decisions. NOTABLE DISSENTS: 1. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer (concurring separately) in Shamsher Singh (1974) — Emphasised that 'pleasure' in Art. 75(2) is not personal royal prerogative but a constitutional mechanism subject to ministerial advice. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. D.D. Basu — Viewed Art. 75 as the linchpin of responsible government; collective responsibility ensures the executive cannot defy the legislature. 2. M.P. Jain — Noted that Art. 75 codifies British conventions but with key Indian adaptations, especially the six-month rule which has no UK parallel. 3. Granville Austin — Described Art. 75 as central to the 'seamless web' connecting the President, PM, and Parliament in India's constitutional design.