Constitution of India
Article 67: Term of office of Vice-President
Part V — The Union (Chapter I — The Executive: The President and Vice-President)
Article 67 (main text)
WHAT IT SAYS: The Vice-President shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office. WHAT IT MEANS: The VP's tenure is fixed at 5 years, starting from the date of assumption of office — not from election date. KEY DOCTRINE: Fixed-term executive office — tenure is date-of-entry based, ensuring clarity on when the term expires.
Proviso (a) — Resignation
WHAT IT SAYS: A Vice-President may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office. WHAT IT MEANS: Resignation is voluntary, requires a written letter addressed to the President, and takes effect immediately upon submission. KEY DOCTRINE: Voluntary relinquishment — no approval or acceptance by the President is constitutionally required. Notable instances: V.V. Giri (1969), R. Venkataraman (1987), and Jagdeep Dhankhar (2025).
Proviso (b) — Removal
WHAT IT SAYS: A Vice-President may be removed by a resolution of the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) passed by a majority of all the then members and agreed to by the House of the People (Lok Sabha); but no such resolution shall be moved unless at least 14 days' notice has been given. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. Resolution must ORIGINATE in Rajya Sabha only. 2. Requires 'effective majority' — majority of all then members (seats not vacant), NOT absolute majority of total strength. 3. Lok Sabha must agree — simple majority suffices. 4. 14 days' prior written notice is mandatory before moving the resolution. 5. NO grounds for removal are specified — unlike President (violation of Constitution) or Judges (proved misbehaviour/incapacity). KEY DOCTRINE: 'Want of confidence' doctrine — Ambedkar clarified this phrase is broad enough to cover corruption, bribery, incapacity, or any other ground.
Proviso (c) — Continuation beyond term
WHAT IT SAYS: A Vice-President shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office. WHAT IT MEANS: There can be no vacancy gap — the outgoing VP continues even after 5 years until the new VP is sworn in, ensuring institutional continuity. KEY DOCTRINE: Holdover provision / Caretaker continuity — prevents constitutional vacuum in the office.
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. United States Constitution — Article I, Section 3 (VP as President of the Senate) and Article II, Section 1 (VP term and succession) Original provision: The US VP serves a 4-year term, presides over the Senate, and automatically succeeds to the Presidency upon vacancy. What India kept: VP as presiding officer of the Upper House (Rajya Sabha), fixed term, and acting as President during vacancy. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Term of 5 years (not 4) — Aligned with the President's 5-year term for constitutional symmetry. 2. VP only 'acts as' President temporarily (max 6 months) — Does NOT succeed permanently, unlike the US VP who becomes full President; reflects India's parliamentary system. 3. Removal by simple parliamentary resolution (not impeachment) — VP's primary role is Chairman of Rajya Sabha, so removal mirrors that of the Speaker, not the President. 4. No grounds specified for removal — Framers deliberately left this open; Ambedkar argued 'want of confidence' covers all grounds. 5. Electoral college limited to Parliament only (no State Legislatures) — VP's role is parliamentary, not federal; unlike the US where the VP is elected nationally via popular vote.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 29th December 1948 (CAD Volume VII) Draft Article Number: 56 KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Chairman, Drafting Committee) — Rejected all amendments; argued VP's removal process should mirror the Speaker's, not the President's, since VP's primary role is Chairman of Rajya Sabha. 2. Prof. K.T. Shah (Bihar) — Proposed 3 new clauses: official residence for VP, salary of Rs. 4,500/month, and post-retirement pension to attract candidates from economically weaker backgrounds. 3. Prof. K.T. Shah (Bihar) — Also proposed specifying grounds for removal: constitutional violation, criminal conviction, mental incapacity, and corruption. 4. Mahboob Ali Baig Sahib Bahadur — Proposed 2/3rd majority in both Houses for removal, arguing VP's dual role (Rajya Sabha Chairman + potential acting President) demands stringent safeguards. 5. Shri H.V. Kamath — Pointed out ambiguity in majority requirement for removal; recommended clearer language. 6. Mr. Mohd. Tahir — Proposed replacing 'all the then members' with 'members present and voting' for the removal resolution. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Grounds for removal — K.T. Shah wanted explicit grounds; Ambedkar opposed, saying 'want of confidence' is broad enough to include corruption, bribery, etc. 2. Majority threshold — Baig wanted 2/3rd majority; Ambedkar said simple effective majority suffices since VP's role parallels the Speaker. 3. Meaning of 'then members' — Tahir wanted 'present and voting'; Ambedkar explained 'then' means all members whose seats are not vacant. FINAL OUTCOME: The Assembly adopted Draft Article 56 WITHOUT any amendments — all proposals by Shah, Baig, Kamath, and Tahir were rejected. AMBEDKAR'S KEY QUOTE: "The word 'then' is important. It means all members whose seats are not vacant. It does not mean members sitting or present and voting."
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. N.B. Khare v. Election Commission of India (1957) — SC held that disputes regarding Presidential/VP elections under Art. 71 can only be raised after the entire election process is completed, not at intermediate stages. 2. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) — SC struck down Clause 4 of Article 329A (inserted by 39th Amendment) which sought to place President/VP elections beyond judicial review; reaffirmed basic structure doctrine applies to protect free and fair elections to constitutional offices. 3. K. Prabhakaran v. Union of India (2008) — SC reaffirmed its exclusive jurisdiction under Article 71 to adjudicate disputes concerning presidential and vice-presidential elections. NOTE ON ARTICLE 67 SPECIFICALLY: — No VP has ever been removed under Article 67(b) in Indian history. — Article 67 has never been amended since its enactment on 26 January 1950. — The first-ever removal resolution against a VP was initiated against Jagdeep Dhankhar in December 2024 by the INDIA bloc, but it did not culminate in removal. NOTABLE DISSENTS: 1. None directly on Article 67 — the provision has not been subject to direct constitutional challenge. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. D.D. Basu — Noted that the absence of specified grounds for VP's removal makes the process political rather than quasi-judicial, unlike presidential impeachment. 2. M.P. Jain — Observed that VP's removal process is simpler than the President's because the VP is primarily a parliamentary officer (Chairman of Rajya Sabha), not the head of state. 3. Subhash Kashyap — Highlighted the constitutional anomaly that VP's removal requires both Houses, whereas President's impeachment process (Art. 61) is initiated in one House only.