Constitution of India
Article 66: Election of Vice-President
Part V — The Union (Chapter I — The Executive: The President and Vice-President)
Clause (1) — Electoral College and Method of Election
WHAT IT SAYS: The Vice-President shall be elected by an electoral college consisting of members of both Houses of Parliament, using proportional representation by single transferable vote, with voting by secret ballot. WHAT IT MEANS: Only MPs (both elected and nominated, from Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha) vote — unlike the Presidential election, state legislatures are excluded. KEY DOCTRINE: Proportional Representation with Single Transferable Vote (PR-STV) — ensures the winning candidate secures broad cross-party support.
Clause (2) — Bar on Holding Legislative Membership
WHAT IT SAYS: The Vice-President shall not be a member of either House of Parliament or any State Legislature; if already a member, the seat is deemed vacated on the date of assuming office. WHAT IT MEANS: Ensures separation of the Vice-President's role from active legislative membership — prevents dual office-holding. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Incompatibility of Offices — same person cannot simultaneously hold the office of Vice-President and a legislative seat.
Clause (3) — Eligibility Qualifications
WHAT IT SAYS: A person must (a) be a citizen of India, (b) have completed 35 years of age, and (c) be qualified for election as a member of the Council of States (Rajya Sabha). WHAT IT MEANS: The Rajya Sabha qualification requirement links to the Vice-President's constitutional role as ex-officio Chairman of the Rajya Sabha (Article 64). KEY DOCTRINE: Functional Nexus Principle — the qualifications for the office mirror the primary function (presiding over Rajya Sabha).
Clause (4) with Explanation — Disqualification: Office of Profit
WHAT IT SAYS: A person holding any office of profit under Central/State Government or any local/other authority under their control is disqualified. Explanation: President, Vice-President, Governor, or Minister are NOT deemed to hold an office of profit. WHAT IT MEANS: The sitting President, Governors, and Ministers can contest Vice-Presidential elections without resigning first. KEY DOCTRINE: Office of Profit Doctrine — prevents conflicts of interest while exempting constitutional office-holders from disqualification.
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. United States Constitution — Article I, Section 3 and Twelfth Amendment Original provision: The US Vice-President serves as President of the Senate and is elected via an Electoral College. What India kept: The concept of Vice-President as ex-officio presiding officer of the Upper House. 2. Ireland — Concept of proportional representation by single transferable vote Original provision: Ireland uses PR-STV for Dáil elections. What India kept: The PR-STV method for Vice-Presidential elections. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Electoral college limited to Parliament only (excluding State Legislatures) — Why: The Vice-President's primary role is parliamentary (Chairman of Rajya Sabha), not federal-executive like the President. 2. Both elected AND nominated MPs vote — Why: Unlike Presidential elections (only elected members), this ensures full parliamentary representation. 3. No term limit on re-election — Why: Framers chose not to restrict re-eligibility, unlike the US 22nd Amendment for the President.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 28 December 1948, 29 December 1948, and 13 October 1949 (CAD Volume VII and Volume X) Draft Article Number: 55 KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Chairman, Drafting Committee) — Defended the smaller electoral college, linking it to the Vice-President's limited functions as Rajya Sabha Chairman. 2. Mr. Tajamul Husain (Bihar) — Proposed that the Vice-Presidential election should follow the same method as the Presidential election (i.e., include state legislatures). 3. Prof. K.T. Shah — Proposed adding explicit disqualifications (conviction for treason, violation of the Constitution, or having served more than once as President/VP). 4. Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad (West Bengal) — Objected to the phrase 'proportional representation', arguing it is meaningless when only one candidate is to be elected. 5. L. Krishnaswami Bharathi (Madras) — Supported Naziruddin Ahmad's concern about the terminology of proportional representation. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Electoral College Composition — Tajamul Husain wanted state legislatures included; Ambedkar rejected this, distinguishing the VP's role from the President's. 2. Additional Disqualifications — K.T. Shah wanted disqualification for treason/constitutional violations; Ambedkar argued these were already covered by Article 83 (now Art. 102) governing Parliamentary disqualifications. 3. 'Office of Emolument' vs 'Office of Profit' — Ambedkar moved to substitute 'office or position of emolument' with 'office of profit' for consistency. FINAL OUTCOME: The Assembly adopted Draft Article 55 on 29 December 1948 with minor drafting amendments moved by Ambedkar; proposals for expanded disqualifications and inclusion of state legislatures were rejected. AMBEDKAR'S KEY QUOTE: "The difference...between the system of election to the Presidentship and...the Vice-Presidentship is based upon the functions which the two dignitaries are supposed to discharge."
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. Loknath Misra v. Union of India (AIR 1972 SC 1916) — Upheld the constitutionality of the Vice-Presidential electoral process, validating proportional representation and secret ballot. 2. In Re Presidential Poll (1974) 2 SCC 33 — Clarified that state legislatures do not participate in the Vice-Presidential electoral college, consistent with Article 66(1). 3. Election Commission of India v. Dr. Subramanian Swamy (1996) 4 SCC 104 — Affirmed the principle of secrecy in voting for constitutional elections. 4. U.N.R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi (1971) 2 SCC 63 — Clarified the scope of 'office of profit' under Article 66(4), establishing that certain government offices can disqualify a candidate. 5. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (AIR 1975 SC 1590) — Reinforced the principle of purity in constitutional elections, with implications for Article 66 procedures. NOTABLE DISSENTS (if any): 1. None of specific significance directly on Article 66. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. V.N. Shukla (Constitution of India, 13th ed.) — Notes that the VP's narrower electoral college reflects the parliamentary rather than federal character of the office. 2. M.P. Jain (Indian Constitutional Law, 8th ed.) — Observes that the 11th Amendment (1961) pragmatically replaced the joint sitting requirement with an electoral college mechanism. 3. Granville Austin (The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation) — Views the VP election framework as reflecting the framers' careful calibration of federal balance. KEY AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 66: 1. Constitution (7th Amendment) Act, 1956 — Omitted the words 'or Rajpramukh or Uparajpramukh' from the Explanation to clause (4), consequent upon the abolition of Part B States. 2. Constitution (11th Amendment) Act, 1961 — Substituted 'members of both Houses of Parliament assembled at a joint meeting' in clause (1) with 'members of an electoral college consisting of the members of both Houses of Parliament', eliminating the impractical joint sitting requirement.