Constitution of India

Article 390: Money received or raised or expenditure incurred between the commencement of the Constitution and the 31st day of March, 1950

Part XXI — Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions

Article 390 (single provision, no sub-clauses)

WHAT IT SAID: Constitutional provisions relating to the Consolidated Fund of India or any State, and appropriation of moneys therefrom, shall not apply to moneys received/raised or expenditure incurred between 26 January 1950 and 31 March 1950; such expenditure is deemed duly authorised if specified in a schedule of authorised expenditure authenticated under the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor-General or Governor, or authorised by the Rajpramukh of a State under pre-existing rules. WHAT IT MEANT: The framers created a 'fiscal bridge' — for the initial ~65 days of the Republic, government spending could continue under colonial-era authorisations without needing fresh parliamentary appropriation under the new Constitution. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Transitional Validation — expenditure lawful under the old regime is deemed valid under the new constitutional order, preventing a legal vacuum in public finance.

Constitutional Inspiration

SOURCE(S): 1. Government of India Act, 1935 (United Kingdom) — Part XIII (Transitional Provisions), particularly the authentication of expenditure schedules under Sections 35 and 80. Original provision: The Governor-General or Provincial Governor authenticated schedules of authorised expenditure as part of the budgetary process under the 1935 Act. What India kept: India retained the mechanism of authenticating expenditure schedules to validate government spending during the transition period. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Time-bound application (only 26 Jan – 31 Mar 1950) — Colonial provisions had no such sunset clause; Indian framers consciously limited this to one financial quarter. 2. Inclusion of Rajpramukhs — Indian princely states (Part B States) had rulers called Rajpramukhs; this was uniquely Indian, absent in the 1935 Act's British-era framework. 3. Self-expiring transitional design — The framers intended this article to become obsolete automatically; it was an original Indian constitutional innovation to embed deliberate obsolescence in the text. IF ORIGINAL INDIAN CONTRIBUTION: The framers felt this was essential to ensure fiscal continuity — the new Constitution's Consolidated Fund provisions could not be operationalised overnight, so a bridging mechanism was needed to prevent any legal challenge to government expenditure during the initial weeks of the Republic.

Constituent Assembly Debate

DEBATED ON: 17 October 1949 (Third Reading, CAD Volume X) and 14–16 November 1949 (Final Revision, CAD Volume XI) KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar — Presented the transitional provisions (Articles 379–391) as a necessary package to ensure continuity of governance during the shift from Dominion to Republic. 2. T.T. Krishnamachari — Supported the fiscal transitional articles, emphasising the practical necessity of validating expenditure already authorised under colonial schedules. 3. H.V. Kamath — Raised procedural queries about the scope of transitional articles but did not oppose Article 390 specifically. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. No significant recorded disagreement on Article 390 — it was accepted as a mechanical/technical necessity. 2. Broader debate existed on Part XXI's scope — some members questioned whether too many transitional powers were being vested in the President without parliamentary oversight. FINAL OUTCOME: Article 390 was adopted without substantial amendment; it was part of the block of transitional provisions (Arts. 379–391) passed as a package during the final readings. AMBEDKAR'S KEY QUOTE (if available): No specific direct quote on Article 390 recorded in the CAD. Ambedkar's general position was that transitional provisions were indispensable scaffolding for the new constitutional structure.

Landmark Judgments

LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. No landmark Supreme Court judgment directly interpreting Article 390 exists — it operated only during 26 Jan–31 Mar 1950 and was omitted in 1956. 2. In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (1951) — Indirectly relevant: upheld the importance of legislative continuity during the transition from colonial to constitutional governance. 3. The transitional articles 379–391 did not generate direct litigation as they were spent provisions by the time the first elections were held in 1951–52. NOTABLE DISSENTS (if any): 1. None — Article 390 never came before the Supreme Court for substantive interpretation. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. Granville Austin — Identified Articles 379–391 as examples of provisions alterable by simple parliamentary majority, classifying them among transitional mechanisms ensuring smooth constitutional commencement. 2. D.D. Basu — Noted that Article 390 served purely as a fiscal bridge provision, validating pre-Constitution expenditure authorisations to prevent any challenge to government spending during the Republic's first financial quarter.