Constitution of India

Article 385: Provision as to provisional Legislatures in States in Part B of the First Schedule [Omitted]

Part XXI — Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions

Article 385 (single, undivided article — no sub-clauses)

WHAT IT SAID: Pre-existing legislative bodies of Part B states (former princely states) would continue to function as the State Legislature until new legislatures were duly constituted and summoned under the Constitution. WHAT IT MEANT: The Rajpramukh or any existing legislative authority in a princely state retained full constitutional legislative powers during the transitional period from 26 January 1950 until a proper legislature was elected and convened. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Transitional Legislative Continuity — interim bodies derived their authority not from pre-existing covenants but from the Constitution itself once Art. 385 was invoked.

Constitutional Inspiration

SOURCE(S): 1. Government of India Act, 1935 — Section 292 (Transitional Provisions) Original provision: Allowed existing provincial legislatures and executive authorities to continue functioning during transition to the new Act's framework. What India kept: The same principle of continuity — letting existing bodies function until constitutional successors were ready. 2. Indian Independence Act, 1947 — Section 19 (Temporary Provisions) Original provision: Allowed existing constitutional machinery to continue until replaced under the new dominion constitutions. What India kept: The bridge mechanism ensuring no governance vacuum during the changeover. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Extended the continuity principle specifically to Part B states (princely states) — Because princely states had diverse governance structures (Rajpramukhs, Durbars, Councils) unlike British provinces. 2. Vested the pre-existing 'body or authority' with full constitutional legislative powers — Because the Constitution wanted to upgrade and standardize the authority of these interim bodies, not merely preserve their old limited powers. 3. Made it explicitly temporary — Because the framers intended democratic elections to replace hereditary or nominated legislative bodies as soon as practicable. ORIGINAL INDIAN CONTRIBUTION: The specific challenge of integrating 550+ princely states into a democratic framework with no legislative vacuum was uniquely Indian; no foreign constitution offered a direct precedent for this scale of transitional governance.

Constituent Assembly Debate

DEBATED ON: 16 November 1949 and related dates (CAD Volume X / XI — Part XXI transitional provisions discussed as a block) KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar — Presented draft articles on transitional provisions as necessary to ensure no governance vacuum in the newly integrated states. 2. T.T. Krishnamachari — Supported the provision and addressed queries on how Part B state legislatures would transition. 3. H.V. Kamath — Raised questions about the extent of Rajpramukh's interim legislative powers. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Scope of Rajpramukh's power — Some members questioned whether giving unelected Rajpramukhs full legislative authority was antidemocratic; it was clarified that Article 385 was strictly transitional. 2. Duration of transitional period — Concerns were raised about how long interim bodies could function; no fixed time limit was set, only the trigger of 'duly constituted' legislatures. FINAL OUTCOME: Article 385 (originally in the Draft Constitution as part of the transitional block) was adopted without significant amendment, reflecting consensus that governance continuity in princely states was paramount. NOTE: The transitional provisions (Articles 379–392) were debated largely as a composite block with limited individual article-level debate, as they were considered mechanical and non-controversial provisions.

Landmark Judgments

LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (1955) — The Supreme Court directly interpreted Article 385 and upheld the Rajpramukh's legislative competence; held that Article 385 conferred on the pre-existing legislative authority all powers of the State Legislature under the Constitution, regardless of the limitations on its original authority. 2. Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1957) — The Court upheld the validity of an Ordinance promulgated by the Rajpramukh, referencing Article 385; confirmed that the Rajpramukh's legislative power under Art. 385 continued until the State Legislature was duly constituted (which happened on 29 March 1952 for Rajasthan). NOTABLE OBSERVATIONS: 1. In Thakur Amar Singhji (1955), the Court held: Article 385 does not require the pre-existing authority to have possessed 'absolute and unlimited powers of legislation' — constitutional powers are conferred afresh by Article 385 itself. 2. The Court clarified that 'body or authority' in Art. 385 must be identified factually; once identified, the extent of its prior powers is immaterial. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. D.D. Basu — Described Article 385 as a 'bridging clause' ensuring princely state legislatures transitioned into the constitutional framework without interruption. 2. M.P. Jain — Noted that Part XXI transitional articles, including Art. 385, represented the 'practical wisdom' of the framers in managing the complex integration of princely states.