Constitution of India
Article 383: Provision as to Governors of Provinces (Omitted)
Part XXI — Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions
Article 383 (single, undivided article — no sub-clauses)
WHAT IT SAID: Any person serving as Governor of a Province immediately before 26 January 1950 would automatically become the Governor of the corresponding Part A State, and would continue until a new Governor was appointed under Chapter II of Part VI (Articles 153–162). WHAT IT MEANT: 1. Provincial Governors under the Government of India Act, 1935 would carry over seamlessly into the new constitutional order. 2. No executive vacuum would occur at the State level on the date of commencement. 3. The continuity was temporary — it lasted only until the President appointed new Governors under Article 155. 4. This applied only to Part A States (former British Provinces), not Part B States (former Princely States). KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Transitional Continuity — existing office-holders continue in office under the new constitutional regime until formally replaced, ensuring unbroken governance.
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. Government of India Act, 1935 (United Kingdom) — Sections 46–57 dealing with appointment and powers of Provincial Governors. Original provision: Governors of British Indian Provinces were appointed by the Crown and exercised executive authority with certain reserved powers. What India kept: The concept that existing Governors would continue to hold office during the transition period, but stripped them of discretionary and reserved powers. 2. Indian Independence Act, 1947 (Section 7) — Provided for continuity of existing governance structures in the Dominion of India. Original provision: The existing governmental machinery would continue until new arrangements were made. What India kept: The principle of administrative continuity during constitutional changeover. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Limited to Part A States only — Because Part B States (former Princely States) had Rajpramukhs, not Governors, and were governed by separate transitional provisions (Articles 385–386). 2. Made Governors purely constitutional heads — Unlike the Government of India Act 1935, where Governors had reserve discretionary powers, the new Constitution subordinated them to the Council of Ministers (Article 163). 3. Time-bound transitional character — Article 383 was explicitly temporary; it operated only until fresh appointments under Article 155. This reflected the framers' intent to break cleanly from colonial governance while avoiding disruption.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 17 October 1949 (CAD Volume X — Third Reading / Finalisation stage) CONTEXT: 1. Article 383 corresponded to Draft Article 304 in the Draft Constitution. 2. It was part of a block of transitional provisions (Draft Articles 300–312) debated together. 3. These provisions were largely technical and procedural — designed to bridge the gap between the Government of India Act regime and the new Constitution. KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Chairman, Drafting Committee) — Moved the transitional provisions as necessary for continuity of governance; treated Art. 383 as non-controversial. 2. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar (Madras) — Supported the need for transitional clauses to avoid administrative chaos in the provinces. 3. T.T. Krishnamachari (Madras) — Endorsed the practical wisdom of retaining existing Governors temporarily. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Minimal disagreement on this article — it was a practical transitional provision, not a policy choice. 2. The broader debate on Governors (elected vs. nominated) had occurred earlier on 30–31 May 1949 (CAD Volume VIII), where the Assembly decided on nomination by the President rather than election. FINAL OUTCOME: Adopted without significant amendment. The Assembly accepted that existing Provincial Governors should continue until replaced under the new constitutional machinery. AMBEDKAR'S KEY QUOTE (from CAD Vol VIII, 31 May 1949, on the Governor's role): "The Governor is to be a purely constitutional Governor. He has no functions which he can discharge either in his discretion or in his individual judgment."
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: Note: Article 383 was a spent transitional provision (operative only from 26 Jan 1950 until new Governors were appointed). No Supreme Court judgment directly interpreted Art. 383. However, the following landmark cases shaped the constitutional role of Governors that Art. 383 initially facilitated: 1. Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) AIR 1974 SC 2192 — A 7-judge bench held that the Governor is a constitutional head bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers; 'satisfaction' means satisfaction in the constitutional, not personal, sense. 2. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) AIR 1994 SC 1918 — A 9-judge bench held that the Governor's report under Art. 356 is subject to judicial review and Art. 356 is an extreme power to be used as a last resort. 3. Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) AIR 2016 SC 4780 — Held that the Governor cannot exercise discretionary powers to summon/prorogue the Assembly when a no-confidence motion is pending against the Speaker. 4. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) (2025) 8 SCC 1 — SC ruled Governors cannot indefinitely delay assent to Bills; there is no 'pocket veto' under Article 200. NOTABLE DISSENTS: 1. No notable dissents specific to Art. 383 exist as it was never directly litigated. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. D.D. Basu — Described Art. 383 as a 'machinery provision' ensuring continuity of the executive at the provincial level during the transition from the Dominion to the Republic. 2. Granville Austin — Noted that transitional provisions like Art. 383 reflected the pragmatic genius of the framers in managing the complex handover from colonial to constitutional governance.