Constitution of India
Article 371: Special provision with respect to the States of Maharashtra and Gujarat
Part XXI — Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions
Clause (1) — [Omitted]
WHAT IT SAID (ORIGINAL 1950 TEXT): Part B States (former princely states) shall be under the general control of, and comply with directions given by, the President for ten years from commencement of the Constitution. WHAT HAPPENED: Clause (1) was substituted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, s.22, to deal with Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, and Bombay. It was later further modified and effectively omitted as those references became spent or were removed by the 32nd Amendment Act, 1973. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Asymmetric Federalism — the Constitution recognises that uniform treatment of all states may not serve equity.
Clause (2) — Special responsibility of the Governor for Maharashtra and Gujarat
WHAT IT SAYS: The President may by order provide that the Governor of Maharashtra or Gujarat shall have special responsibility for: (a) Establishing separate development boards for Vidarbha, Marathwada, and the rest of Maharashtra; or Saurashtra, Kutch, and the rest of Gujarat — with annual reports to the State Legislative Assembly. (b) Equitable allocation of funds for developmental expenditure over the said areas, subject to State-wide requirements. (c) Equitable arrangement for adequate technical education, vocational training, and employment opportunities in State Government services across all said areas. WHAT IT MEANS: The Governor acts as a constitutional custodian for balanced regional development within these two states, ensuring backward regions (Vidarbha, Marathwada, Saurashtra, Kutch) are not neglected. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Regional Equity — the Governor has a non-discretionary constitutional duty (once the President issues an order) to ensure equitable development, going beyond political promises to a constitutional obligation.
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. Government of India Act, 1935 — Sections dealing with transitional control over Indian States (Part B States / Princely States) Original provision: The Crown retained residual supervisory authority over the Indian States during the transitional phase of integration. What India kept: The idea that newly integrated states (Part B States) would remain under temporary central control during a transitional period. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Time-limited Central control (10 years) over Part B States — Framers recognised that former princely states needed an adjustment period to align with democratic governance norms. 2. Substitution from central control to development-oriented gubernatorial responsibility (post-7th Amendment) — After States Reorganisation, regional disparity within linguistically reorganised states became the concern, not princely state integration. 3. Focus on equitable fund allocation and development boards — A uniquely Indian innovation; no foreign model had constitutional mechanisms for intra-state regional equity via the Governor. IF ORIGINAL INDIAN CONTRIBUTION: The post-1956 Article 371(2) is an original Indian contribution born out of the unique challenge of linguistic state reorganisation, where regions like Vidarbha and Marathwada feared economic marginalisation within a larger state dominated by more developed areas.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 13 October 1949 (CAD Volume X, pages 175–228) DRAFT ARTICLE: 306B KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel — Moved the article; explained that temporary central control over Part B States was needed to ensure administrative stability during the transition from princely rule to democratic governance. 2. Shri S. Nagappa (Mysore State) — Opposed the provision as striking at the root of democratic institutions; argued it imposed bureaucratic central rule over states. 3. Shri K. Chengalaraya Reddy (Mysore State) — Supported the need for differentiation between Provinces and States given their varying administrative experience. 4. Shri Thanu Pillai — Proposed that states be divided into categories, and advanced states like Mysore and Travancore be excluded from central control. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Duration of central control — One member wanted the 10-year period extended indefinitely; others felt it was too long. 2. Differentiation between Provinces and States — Critics argued Article 306B violated democratic principles by subordinating elected state governments to central bureaucratic control. 3. Scope of application — Some insisted not all Part III states (Draft Schedule) needed such oversight; advanced states like Mysore should be exempted. FINAL OUTCOME: Draft Article 306B was adopted on 13 October 1949 without accepting any of the proposed amendments; the proviso allowing the President to exempt specific states by order was retained as a compromise. SARDAR PATEL'S KEY POSITION: He assured the Assembly that the provision was a transitional safeguard, not a permanent instrument of central dominance, and that the President's exemption power would be used judiciously for well-governed states.
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. P. Sambamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1987) — Struck down clause (5) of Article 371-D as unconstitutional for violating the basic structure doctrine by enabling the executive to override Administrative Tribunal orders, thus undermining judicial review. 2. R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India (1994) — Upheld the constitutionality of Article 371-F (Sikkim); affirmed that asymmetric federalism and special provisions for states do not violate the basic structure, so long as they serve the purpose of integration. 3. State of Sikkim v. Surendra Prasad Sharma (1994) — Affirmed that the non obstante clause in Article 371-F(k) shields existing state laws from challenge under Articles 14 and 16, facilitating smooth transitional integration of Sikkim. 4. Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay (1960) — Upheld the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and the formation of composite Bombay State; contextually affirmed Parliament's plenary power in state reorganisation, the backdrop for Article 371's post-1956 form. NOTABLE DISSENTS (if any): 1. No major recorded dissent in the P. Sambamurthy case — the decision was unanimous in striking down clause (5) of Article 371-D. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. M.P. Jain — Described Article 371 provisions as embodying the principle of asymmetric federalism, a necessary feature of India's diverse constitutional framework. 2. D.D. Basu — Noted that Article 371 represents special accommodations that do not create a separate class of states but address specific regional imbalances through constitutionally mandated gubernatorial oversight.