Constitution of India
Article 357: Exercise of legislative powers under Proclamation issued under article 356
Part XVIII — Emergency Provisions
Clause (1) — Legislative powers during President's Rule
WHAT IT SAYS: When a Proclamation under Art. 356(1) declares that State Legislature powers shall be exercised by/under Parliament's authority, then: (a) Parliament may confer State legislative power on the President, who may delegate it to any specified authority. (b) Parliament / President / delegated authority may make laws conferring powers and duties on the Union or its officers. (c) President may authorise expenditure from the State's Consolidated Fund when Lok Sabha is not in session, pending Parliament's sanction. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. Parliament becomes the de facto State Legislature during President's Rule. 2. President can be given law-making power for the State and may sub-delegate it (e.g., to Governor). 3. Financial governance continues — President can sanction State spending in Parliament's recess. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Delegated Legislation under Emergency — power flows from Parliament → President → delegated authority; all such exercises are legislative, not executive, in character (confirmed in A.K. Roy v. Union of India, 1982).
Clause (2) — Continuity of laws after Proclamation ceases [as substituted by 42nd Amendment Act, 1976, Section 51]
WHAT IT SAYS: Any law made by Parliament / President / delegated authority under Clause (1)(a) — which they would NOT have been competent to make but for the Art. 356 Proclamation — shall, after the Proclamation ceases to operate, CONTINUE IN FORCE until altered, repealed, or amended by a competent Legislature or authority. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. Laws made during President's Rule do NOT automatically lapse when Proclamation ends. 2. They remain valid indefinitely until the restored State Legislature (or other competent body) actively changes or repeals them. 3. This ensures no legal vacuum during transition from central to state governance. ORIGINAL CLAUSE (2) BEFORE 42ND AMENDMENT: Originally, such laws would CEASE to have effect on expiration of ONE YEAR after the Proclamation ceased to operate, except for things already done or omitted. They could be earlier repealed or re-enacted (with or without modification) by the appropriate Legislature. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Legislative Continuity during State Emergency — the 42nd Amendment removed the one-year sunset clause and made continuation indefinite until actively altered.
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. Government of India Act, 1935 — Section 93 Original provision: Governor could assume all powers of any provincial body (Ministry, Legislature) if satisfied governance could not be carried on per the Act. What India kept: The concept of central intervention when State constitutional machinery fails; but shifted power from Governor to President acting on Governor's report. 2. Government of India Act, 1935 — Section 45 Original provision: Governor-General had similar powers at federal level (though this Part never came into operation). What India kept: The principle of executive assumption of legislative power during constitutional breakdown. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Power vested in President (not Governor) — Because framers made Governor a nominated, not elected, functionary and wanted democratic accountability at the Centre. 2. Parliament's role made central — Unlike Section 93 where Governor acted alone, Art. 357 requires Parliament to confer legislative power on the President, ensuring parliamentary oversight. 3. Sub-delegation expressly permitted — President can delegate to any specified authority, accommodating the practical burden on Parliament of legislating for suspended States. 4. Financial safeguard added via Clause (1)(c) — No equivalent existed in Section 93; ensures budgetary continuity with eventual Parliamentary sanction. 5. No analogue in US Constitution — Article IV(4) of the US Constitution guarantees republican government in States but prescribes no mechanism to suspend or supersede State machinery.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 3 August 1949 and 4 August 1949 (CAD Volume IX) DRAFT ARTICLE NUMBER: Draft Article 278-A (corresponding to present Article 357) KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Chairman, Drafting Committee) — Moved the new Draft Article 278-A; explained it was needed for a specific type of emergency (failure of State constitutional machinery), distinct from other emergency provisions. 2. Shri H.V. Kamath (C.P. & Berar) — Strongly opposed expansion of Presidential powers; called the word 'otherwise' in Art. 278 (Art. 356) a 'diabolical word' and a 'constitutional crime' enabling unchecked central interference. 3. Shri Raj Bahadur (United State of Matsya) — Supported Ambedkar; argued that safeguards for emergencies were essential, citing the example of France's frequent government changes and Newfoundland's financial breakdown. 4. Shri B.M. Gupte (Bombay) — Sympathised with Kamath's concerns but supported deletion of Art. 188 and the new scheme. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Necessity of Art. 278-A — Some members argued the Union already had sufficient powers under Draft Articles 275 and 276 (national emergency provisions), making 278-A redundant. Ambedkar disagreed, stating 278-A addressed a distinct emergency type. 2. State Assembly primacy vs. Central control — One member argued the State Assembly must be given primacy during State emergency; otherwise, the Union Parliament and Central Executive would become unpopular with the people of the State. 3. Scope of 'otherwise' in Art. 278 — Kamath demanded the President act ONLY on Governor's report, not 'otherwise'; Ambedkar said the language was deliberately made elastic. FINAL OUTCOME: Draft Article 278-A was adopted as moved by Ambedkar, with sub-clauses on delegation of legislative power and budget authorisation; Kamath's restrictive amendments were rejected. AMBEDKAR'S KEY QUOTE: Dr. Ambedkar hoped that Article 356 (and consequently 357) would 'remain a dead letter' and never be called into operation — expressing the framers' intent for these to be last-resort measures only.
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) — The Supreme Court held that power exercised by the President under Art. 357(1)(a), and even by his delegate, is legislative in character, not executive; ordinances and laws under Art. 357 partake fully of legislative power. 2. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) — The Court recognised the broad scope of legislative and administrative authority under Art. 357 during President's Rule, but warned such powers must not be exercised arbitrarily or for political ends. 3. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — The nine-judge bench held that imposition of President's Rule under Art. 356 and exercise of powers under Art. 357 are subject to judicial review; federalism is part of the basic structure and any central action must adhere to this principle. 4. Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) — The Court reaffirmed that imposition of President's Rule and exercise of legislative powers under Art. 357 are constitutional only if they adhere to democratic and federal principles. NOTABLE DISSENTS: 1. Justice A.C. Gupta in A.K. Roy (1982) — Dissented on the characterisation of ordinance-making power, arguing that the President's power is fundamentally different from parliamentary legislation and the two should not be fully equated. COMMISSION REPORTS: 1. Sarkaria Commission (1988) — Recommended strict guidelines for use of President's Rule and exercise of legislative powers under Art. 357 to prevent political misuse by the Centre against opposition-ruled States. 2. Punchhi Commission (2010) — Suggested further reforms to ensure judicious use of Art. 357, protect state autonomy, and maintain the federal balance. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. H.M. Seervai — Argued that Art. 357 must be read strictly as a consequential provision to Art. 356, and any expansive interpretation would undermine India's federal structure. 2. D.D. Basu — Noted that Art. 357 provides a complete mechanism for legislative governance during President's Rule, ensuring no constitutional vacuum but requiring democratic safeguards against misuse.