Constitution of India
Article 197: Restriction on powers of Legislative Council as to Bills other than Money Bills
Part VI — The States (Chapter III — The State Legislature, Sub-heading: Legislative Procedure)
Clause (1) — First transmission to Legislative Council
WHAT IT SAYS: 1. When a Bill (other than a Money Bill) passed by the Legislative Assembly is sent to the Legislative Council and — (a) the Council rejects the Bill, OR (b) more than 3 months elapse without the Council passing it, OR (c) the Council passes it with amendments the Assembly does not accept — 2. The Assembly may re-pass the Bill (same or subsequent session), with or without Council-suggested amendments, and retransmit it to the Council. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. The Legislative Council gets a first opportunity of 3 months to consider an ordinary Bill. 2. If the Council blocks, delays, or amends unacceptably, the Assembly can override by re-passing the Bill. 3. The Assembly is free to adopt, partially adopt, or reject Council amendments. KEY DOCTRINE: 1. Doctrine of Legislative Assembly Supremacy at the state level — the directly elected house prevails over the indirectly constituted upper house.
Clause (2) — Second transmission — deemed passage
WHAT IT SAYS: 1. When the Bill is passed a second time by the Assembly and sent again to the Council, and — (a) the Council rejects it again, OR (b) more than 1 month elapses without it being passed, OR (c) the Council passes it with amendments the Assembly does not accept — 2. The Bill is DEEMED to have been passed by BOTH Houses in the form passed by the Assembly the second time, with only those Council amendments the Assembly agreed to. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. The Council's maximum total delaying power for ordinary Bills = 4 months (3 months + 1 month). 2. After the second round, the Council has NO veto — the Bill automatically becomes deemed passed. 3. No joint sitting mechanism exists at the state level (unlike Article 108 for Parliament). KEY DOCTRINE: 1. Doctrine of Deemed Passage — the Bill becomes law in the Assembly's version without requiring Council's affirmative consent.
Clause (3) — Exclusion of Money Bills
WHAT IT SAYS: 1. Nothing in this article applies to a Money Bill. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. Money Bills are governed separately under Articles 198 and 199. 2. The Council's power over Money Bills is even more restricted — it can only recommend (not amend), with a 14-day time limit. 3. This clause ensures no overlap or confusion between ordinary Bill and Money Bill procedures. KEY DOCTRINE: 1. Doctrine of Financial Primacy of the Lower House — Money Bills have a distinct and even more restrictive regime for the upper house.
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. [United Kingdom — Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949] Original provision: The Parliament Act 1911 removed the House of Lords' veto over Money Bills and replaced its veto over other public Bills with a power of delay (originally 2 years, reduced to 1 year by the 1949 Act). What India kept: The principle that the upper house can only delay (not veto) ordinary legislation, and the lower house ultimately prevails. 2. [Government of India Act, 1935 — Sections 67-68] Original provision: Provided for joint sittings of bicameral provincial legislatures in case of deadlock over Bills. What India kept: The concept of resolving inter-house disputes, but REPLACED joint sittings with deemed passage in favour of the Assembly. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. No joint sitting at state level — Unlike Parliament (Article 108), Article 197 gives the Assembly outright supremacy without any joint sitting mechanism, because framers wanted faster resolution at the state level. 2. Shorter delay periods (3+1 = 4 months) — Compared to 6 months under the original Draft Article 172 and compared to the UK's 1-2 year delay, India imposed much shorter timelines to ensure legislative efficiency in states. 3. Deemed passage mechanism — The Bill is automatically deemed passed after the second round, a distinctly Indian innovation ensuring the Council cannot permanently obstruct governance.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 1 August 1949 (CAD Volume IX) DRAFT ARTICLE NUMBER: Draft Article 172 KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Chairman, Drafting Committee) — Moved a complete substitution of Draft Article 172, replacing the joint sitting mechanism with Assembly supremacy; argued the original six-month delay was too long and the joint sitting procedure was unworkable at the state level. 2. Shri Brajeshwar Prasad (Bihar: General) — Opposed Dr. Ambedkar's amendment; argued the joint sitting provision was salutary; said vesting all power in the Lower House under adult franchise was risky. 3. T.T. Krishnamachari (Madras) — Supported Ambedkar's amendment; argued the Upper Chamber was always intended as a revising body, not one with equal powers; stated the article followed English practice. 4. A member of the Drafting Committee — Moved a sub-amendment to increase the time limit in Clause (1)(b) from two months to three months to give the Council adequate deliberation time. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Joint sitting vs. Assembly supremacy — Brajeshwar Prasad wanted to retain joint sittings (as in the original draft and as exists for Parliament under Article 108); Ambedkar replaced it with outright Assembly override. 2. Time period for Council consideration — Original amendment gave only 2 months; members argued this was too short; Ambedkar accepted the increase to 3 months. FINAL OUTCOME: Both amendments (complete substitution removing joint sitting + increase of time from 2 to 3 months) were accepted; the amended Draft Article was adopted on 1 August 1949. AMBEDKAR'S KEY POSITION: The original draft's six-month period and joint-sitting mechanism could delay legislation indefinitely; the Council should check hasty legislation but must not have coordinate power with the Assembly.
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) — Established the Basic Structure Doctrine; indirectly reinforced that the principle of representative democracy and supremacy of the elected house in legislative process is a basic feature of the Constitution. 2. State of Bihar v. Bihar Legislative Assembly (2000) — The Supreme Court clarified that the Legislative Council serves an advisory and reviewing role, while the Legislative Assembly holds ultimate legislative supremacy under Article 197. 3. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) — Highlighted the importance of strict adherence to constitutional procedures in law-making under Articles 196-200, reinforcing that legislative processes must follow prescribed procedures. NOTE ON CASE LAW: 1. No specific landmark case has been decided solely on Article 197 — the article deals with intra-legislative procedure, which is typically resolved within legislative protocols rather than through judicial review. 2. The above cases reference Article 197's principles in the broader context of legislative supremacy, democratic accountability, and procedural compliance. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. D.D. Basu — Observed that Article 197 makes the Legislative Council a subordinate and dilatory chamber, not a coordinate one, ensuring the will of the elected Assembly prevails. 2. M.P. Jain — Noted that unlike Parliament where deadlocks are resolved via joint sittings (Article 108), at the state level the Assembly has absolute supremacy through the deemed passage mechanism, making the Council essentially a revisory body with only delaying power.