Constitution of India
Article 158: Conditions of Governor's office
Part VI — The States (Chapter II — The Executive)
Clause (1) — No membership of Legislature
WHAT IT SAYS: The Governor shall not be a member of either House of Parliament or of a House of the Legislature of any State in the First Schedule; if a sitting member is appointed Governor, he is deemed to have vacated that seat on the date he enters office. WHAT IT MEANS: A Governor must sever all legislative ties before functioning — ensuring complete separation from party-political legislative activity. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Incompatibility of Offices — one person cannot simultaneously hold executive and legislative positions that conflict.
Clause (2) — No office of profit
WHAT IT SAYS: The Governor shall not hold any other office of profit. WHAT IT MEANS: Prevents conflict of interest — the Governor must devote full attention to constitutional duties without any parallel paid position, even honorary posts carrying executive responsibility. KEY DOCTRINE: Office of Profit doctrine — the SC in Hargovind Pant v. Raghukul Tilak (1979) clarified that the Governorship itself is NOT 'employment under the Government of India' but an independent constitutional office.
Clause (3) — Official residence and emoluments
WHAT IT SAYS: The Governor is entitled without payment of rent to the use of official residences, and to such emoluments, allowances, and privileges as Parliament may determine by law; until Parliament acts, the Second Schedule governs. WHAT IT MEANS: Financial independence is guaranteed — Parliament (not the State Legislature) fixes Governor's pay, ensuring the State cannot use financial pressure to influence the Governor. KEY DOCTRINE: Principle of Financial Independence of Constitutional Functionaries — analogous to protections for the President under Article 59.
Clause (3A) — Allocation when Governor serves multiple States [Inserted by 7th Amendment Act, 1956]
WHAT IT SAYS: Where the same person is appointed Governor of two or more States, the emoluments and allowances shall be allocated among those States in such proportion as the President may by order determine. WHAT IT MEANS: Provides an administrative mechanism for cost-sharing when one Governor serves multiple States (read with Article 153 proviso, also added by 7th Amendment). KEY DOCTRINE: Federal Administrative Flexibility — enables rationalization of gubernatorial appointments post States Reorganisation.
Clause (4) — Non-diminution of emoluments
WHAT IT SAYS: The emoluments and allowances of the Governor shall not be diminished during his term of office. WHAT IT MEANS: Protects the Governor from financial coercion — neither Parliament nor any authority can reduce pay during tenure, mirroring protections for SC/HC judges. KEY DOCTRINE: Security of Tenure via Financial Protection — ensures independence and dignity of the office against political pressure.
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. Government of India Act, 1935 — Sections 49-50 (Conditions of Governor's office under colonial framework) Original provision: Provincial Governors had salaries fixed by statute and could not hold other offices, though they served under Crown's pleasure. What India kept: The structural framework of conditions of office — no other office of profit, official residence, emoluments protection. 2. Constitution of Ireland, 1937 — Article 12 (Presidential conditions) Original provision: The President of Ireland shall not hold any other office of profit and is entitled to official residence. What India kept: The concept of rent-free official residence and prohibition on holding office of profit for the constitutional head. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Parliament, not the State Legislature, determines emoluments — because the Governor is appointed by the President, not elected by the State; prevents State-level financial pressure. 2. Clause (3A) added in 1956 for multi-State Governors — unique Indian innovation necessitated by States Reorganisation and the vast number of States. 3. Deemed vacation of legislative seat on entering office — automatic operation of law, unlike some systems requiring formal resignation, ensuring no gap in compliance.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 31st May 1949 and 14th October 1949 (CAD Volume VIII and Volume X) Draft Article Number: 135 KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Chairman, Drafting Committee) — Moved amendments to Clause (1) to cover 'either House of Parliament or of a House' of any State Legislature, and amended Clause (2) to read 'office of profit' instead of 'office or position of emolument'. 2. Shri Brajeshwar Prasad (Bihar) — Raised the question whether the same person could be Governor of two or more provinces; the President ruled his amendment was not moved. 3. Shri M. Thirumala Rao — Questioned the Drafting Committee's proviso fixing a minimum salary of Rs. 4,500 for Governors. 4. T.T. Krishnamachari (Madras, Drafting Committee member) — Proposed on 14th October 1949 that Clause (3) be amended to entitle Governor to rent-free official residence and that Parliament (not State Legislature) should determine emoluments. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Official Residence Clause — A member proposed deleting the requirement for an official residence as a minor detail unworthy of constitutional mention; Ambedkar defended it as analogous to the President's residence under Draft Article 48 (Article 59). 2. Who fixes emoluments — Original draft gave this power to the State Legislature; T.T. Krishnamachari argued it should be Parliament since the Governor is appointed by the President, not chosen by the State. 3. Governor's salary level — Some members objected to Rs. 4,500/month as excessive for a 'merely titular' head. FINAL OUTCOME: Ambedkar's amendments to Clauses (1) and (2) were adopted on 31st May 1949; Krishnamachari's amendments shifting emolument-fixing power to Parliament and adding rent-free residence were adopted without much opposition on 14th October 1949. AMBEDKAR'S KEY QUOTE: Defended the official residence provision as necessary and 'analogous to Draft Article 48 which set out the official residence of the President.'
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. Hargovind Pant v. Dr. Raghukul Tilak (1979) [AIR 1979 SC 1109] — The office of Governor is NOT 'employment under the Government of India'; it is an independent constitutional office not subject to control of the Central Government. 2. B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) [2010 (6) SCC 331] — The President can remove a Governor without assigning reasons, but removal must not be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; doctrine of pleasure is subject to judicial review. 3. Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) [(2017) 13 SCC 332] — Governor's discretion under Article 163 is limited; Governor must act with aid and advice of Council of Ministers; reinforced that Governors must remain politically neutral (relevant to Article 158's policy of independence). 4. Surya Narain Choudhary v. Union of India (1981) [AIR 1982 Raj 1] — Rajasthan HC held that Article 158(2) bars a sitting Chief Justice discharging Governor's functions from holding office of profit; also held that President's pleasure under Article 156(1) prevails over five-year term. NOTABLE DISSENTS (if any): 1. No notable recorded dissent specifically on Article 158 interpretation; the Hargovind Pant (1979) decision was unanimous by a 5-judge bench (Bhagwati, Chandrachud CJ, Untwalia, Fazal Ali, Pathak JJ.). SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. Sarkaria Commission (1988) — Recommended Governors should not be removed before completing five years except in rare circumstances; reinforced the importance of conditions of office under Article 158 for Governor's independence. 2. Punchhi Commission (2010) — Suggested deleting 'during the pleasure of the President' from Article 156 and recommended that a Governor should be removable only by State Legislature resolution, strengthening the independence framework that Article 158 supports. 3. D.D. Basu — Noted that Article 158 mirrors Article 59 (President's conditions) but critically differs in that no impeachment procedure exists for Governors, making the conditions of office the primary safeguard of independence.