Constitution of India
Article 156: Term of office of Governor
Part VI — The States (Chapter II — The Executive)
Clause (1)
WHAT IT SAYS: The Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. WHAT IT MEANS: The President (acting on advice of Union Council of Ministers under Art. 74) can remove the Governor at any time without assigning reasons or giving notice. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Pleasure — borrowed from British Crown prerogative; NOT absolute in India — must be exercised for valid, compelling reasons (B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, 2010).
Clause (2)
WHAT IT SAYS: The Governor may resign by writing under his hand addressed to the President. WHAT IT MEANS: Resignation is voluntary and becomes effective upon acceptance by the President; no requirement to state reasons. KEY DOCTRINE: No specific doctrine — this is a standard resignation provision paralleling Art. 56(1)(a) for the President.
Clause (3)
WHAT IT SAYS: Subject to Clauses (1) and (2), the Governor holds office for a term of five years from date of entering office. Proviso: Governor continues in office after term expires until successor enters upon office. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. Five-year term is the norm but is NOT a guaranteed or irremovable tenure — it is subordinate to the pleasure doctrine in Clause (1). 2. The proviso prevents an interregnum — ensures continuity of state executive. 3. Governor can be reappointed for successive terms at the President's discretion. KEY DOCTRINE: Subordination of fixed tenure to pleasure doctrine — Clause (3) is expressly subject to Clause (1), so pleasure overrides the five-year term (confirmed in B.P. Singhal, 2010).
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. British Constitutional Convention — Crown's prerogative to appoint and remove Governors-General 'during pleasure'. Original provision: Under British common law, civil servants and Crown appointees held office durante bene placito (during good pleasure), terminable without notice or cause. What India kept: The phrase 'during the pleasure of the President' in Clause (1), directly modeled on the Crown's pleasure doctrine. 2. Canada — Appointment of Lieutenant-Governors by Governor-General (Section 59, Constitution Act 1867). Original provision: Lieutenant-Governor of a province holds office during the pleasure of the Governor-General; normal tenure five years. What India kept: Both the appointed (not elected) Governor model and the five-year normal term subject to pleasure. 3. Government of India Act, 1935 — Provincial Governor provisions (Sections 48-50). Original provision: Governor appointed by the Crown, held office during His Majesty's pleasure, exercised powers at discretion. What India kept: The basic structural framework of an appointed Governor serving at the Centre's pleasure. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. No impeachment for Governor (unlike the US model for state officials) — Ambedkar argued the broad pleasure formula was sufficient, making express enumeration of removal grounds unnecessary. 2. Pleasure of the President (not of Parliament) — Ensures executive control and swift removal without legislative process, reflecting India's need for Centre-State coordination. 3. Proviso for continuity (holdover clause) — Original Indian addition to prevent administrative vacuum in states during transition.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 31st May 1949 (CAD Volume VIII) Draft Article Number: 132 KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Chairman, Drafting Committee) — Moved an amendment to wholly replace Draft Article 132; proposed Governor serve 'during the pleasure of the President' instead of the original provision for impeachment-based removal. 2. Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena (United Provinces) — Opposed Ambedkar's amendment; argued it was a fundamental change from the original draft and would make the Governor 'a creature of the President', undermining independence. 3. Prof. K.T. Shah (Bihar) — Proposed Governor should be irremovable during his term; also moved amendments for impeachment on grounds of treason, corruption, or constitutional violation. 4. Shri Brajeshwar Prasad — Supported the pleasure doctrine, noting the Assembly had already decided on presidential appointment. 5. Shri T.T. Krishnamachari — Clarified that since the Governor was to be a presidential appointee, the President should logically have the right to remove his appointee. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Pleasure Doctrine vs. Fixed Tenure — Prof. K.T. Shah and Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena wanted the Governor to have an irremovable fixed term or removal only via impeachment; Ambedkar rejected this. 2. Enumeration of Removal Grounds — K.T. Shah proposed specific grounds (treason, corruption, incapacity); Ambedkar argued it was 'quite unnecessary to burden the Constitution with all these limitations' when the pleasure formula already covered all grounds. FINAL OUTCOME: Ambedkar's amendment was adopted; the original Draft Article 132 (which provided for impeachment-based removal and resignation to the Speaker) was wholly substituted with the current 3-clause structure based on presidential pleasure. AMBEDKAR'S KEY QUOTE: 'It seems quite unnecessary to burden the Constitution with all these limitations stated in express terms when it is perfectly possible for the President to act upon the very same ground under the formula that the Governor shall hold office during his pleasure.'
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831 — The Governor is a constitutional head who must ordinarily act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers; pleasure of the President is exercised on ministerial advice under Art. 74. 2. Surya Narain Choudhary v. Union of India (1981, Rajasthan HC) — Held that the pleasure of the President under Art. 156(1) was not justiciable; the Governor had no security of tenure and could be removed at any time. 3. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1 — Though concerning President's Rule under Art. 356, the Court discussed the Governor's role in maintaining constitutional order and cautioned against politically motivated misuse of power. 4. Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006) 2 SCC 1 — Held the dissolution of Bihar Assembly unconstitutional; reiterated that Governors must act within constitutional morality and discretionary powers cannot be exercised arbitrarily. 5. B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) 6 SCC 331 — MOST IMPORTANT: Five-judge Constitution Bench held: (a) President can remove Governor without giving reasons or opportunity to be heard; (b) But removal cannot be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (c) Must be for valid and compelling reasons; (d) Political disagreement or change of government at Centre is NOT sufficient ground; (e) Removal is subject to judicial review. NOTABLE DISSENTS: 1. No formal dissent in B.P. Singhal — the Constitution Bench ruled unanimously. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. Sarkaria Commission (1988) — Recommended Governors should not be removed before completing five-year tenure except in 'rare and compelling circumstances'; prior consultation with Chief Minister needed. 2. Punchhi Commission (2010) — Suggested fixed five-year tenure for Governors with removal only through a consultative process involving the State government. 3. H.M. Seervai (Constitutional Law of India) — Criticized the pleasure doctrine for undermining federal autonomy and Governor's independence.