Constitution of India
Article 155: Appointment of Governor
Part VI — The States (Chapter II — The Executive)
Article 155 (no sub-clauses)
WHAT IT SAYS: The Governor of a State shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. The President is the sole appointing authority for all State Governors. 2. The appointment is formalised through a presidential warrant — a constitutional formality requiring the President's signature and seal. 3. In practice, the President acts on the advice of the Union Council of Ministers (Article 74), so the Central Government effectively selects the Governor. 4. The Governor is neither directly elected by the people nor indirectly elected by an electoral college. 5. No constitutional requirement exists to consult the concerned State Government or Chief Minister before appointment. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Pleasure — read with Article 156, the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President; appointment and removal are both at presidential discretion (as interpreted in B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, 2010).
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. Canada — British North America Act, 1867 (now Constitution Act, 1867), Section 58 Original provision: The Governor of each Canadian province is appointed by the Governor-General (representing the Crown) by instrument under the Great Seal of Canada. What India kept: The President (India's Head of State) appoints the Governor by warrant under hand and seal — mirroring the Canadian model of a nominated, non-elected Governor. 2. Government of India Act, 1935 — Section 48 Original provision: Provincial Governors were appointed by the British Crown and held office during His Majesty's pleasure. What India kept: The mechanism of appointment by a higher executive authority and the pleasure doctrine for tenure. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Rejected the American model of elected Governors — To avoid clashes between a popularly elected Governor and a popularly elected Chief Minister. 2. Rejected election from a panel of four candidates (Draft Article 131, Alternative B) — To avoid factionalism within state legislatures and give the President unfettered choice. 3. Rejected direct election by state electorate (Draft Article 131, Alternative A) — To keep the Governor detached from state politics and ensure impartiality. 4. Adopted the Canadian model of pure nomination — To ensure the Governor functions as a constitutional head, not a rival power centre to the Chief Minister.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 30th May 1949 and 31st May 1949 (CAD Volume VIII) DRAFT ARTICLE: 131 (had two alternative versions — one for election, one for appointment from a panel) KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Chairman, Drafting Committee) — Left the question open to the House, stating that if the Governor is purely a constitutional head, it is 'quite immaterial whether he is nominated or elected.' 2. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar (Drafting Committee, Madras) — Favoured the Canadian model of appointment, arguing it would be better 'in the interests of harmony' and 'sounder relations between the provincial cabinet and the Governor.' 3. Jawaharlal Nehru (Prime Minister) — Supported appointment, stating it would ensure the Governor was detached from state politics and able to operate fairly and impartially. 4. Brajeshwar Prasad (Bihar) — Moved the decisive amendment (No. 2015) to replace the entire Draft Article with: 'The Governor of a State shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal.' Argued the Draft Article gave too much leeway to the Legislature. 5. Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena — Opposed making the Governor removable at the President's pleasure, warning he would become 'purely a creature of the President, that is to say, the Prime Minister and the party in power at the Centre.' MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Election vs. Appointment — Some members cited an earlier Assembly resolution favouring election of Governors; others argued an elected Governor would create a parallel power centre conflicting with the Chief Minister. 2. Appointment from Panel vs. Direct Presidential Appointment — Many opposed the panel system in Draft Article 131 as encouraging factionalism in state legislatures. 3. Security of Tenure — Concern that a nominated Governor would be subservient to the Centre with no independence. FINAL OUTCOME: The Assembly voted in favour of appointment (not election), accepted Brajeshwar Prasad's amendment giving the President unfettered right to appoint, and the amended Draft Article was adopted on 31st May 1949. AMBEDKAR'S KEY QUOTE: 'If the Constitution remains in principle the same as we intend...that the Governor should be a purely constitutional Governor, with no power of interference in the administration of the province, then it seems to me quite immaterial whether he is nominated or elected.'
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) — Seven-judge bench held that the President and Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in exercising formal constitutional powers; the Governor is bound by ministerial advice except in limited discretionary matters. 2. Hargovind Pant v. Dr. Raghukul Tilak (1979) — Constitution Bench held that the office of Governor is an independent constitutional office, not an 'employment under the Government of India'; the Governor is not subordinate to or controlled by the Central Government. 3. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — Nine-judge bench highlighted the constitutional role of the Governor and the necessity of maintaining the dignity and impartiality of the office; the Governor's report under Article 356 must not be politically motivated. 4. B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) — Constitution Bench held that the President's power to remove a Governor (under Articles 155-156) is not absolute; removal must not be arbitrary, whimsical, or politically motivated, and is subject to judicial review. A change in the Union Government alone does not justify removal of Governors. 5. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) — Supreme Court held that the Governor cannot indefinitely delay assent to Bills; must act within constitutional limits as an appointee under Article 155. NOTABLE DISSENTS: 1. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Shamsher Singh (1974) — Wrote a concurring but more emphatic opinion emphasising that the Governor's discretionary powers must be construed very narrowly, lest the office become an instrument of Central Government interference. COMMISSIONS & SCHOLARS: 1. Sarkaria Commission (1988) — Recommended that Governors should be eminent persons from outside the state, not active in politics; appointment under Article 155 should involve consultation with the Chief Minister of the concerned state. 2. M.M. Punchhi Commission (2010) — Recommended fixed tenure for Governors, a selection committee including the PM, Home Minister, Lok Sabha Speaker and Chief Minister, and deletion of the pleasure doctrine to prevent arbitrary removals. 3. National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2002, Venkatachaliah Commission) — Recommended amending Articles 155 and 156 to provide for a committee-based selection process and fixed five-year tenure.