Constitution of India

Article 153: Governors of States

Part VI — The States

Article 153 (Main Text with Proviso)

WHAT IT SAYS: 1. There shall be a Governor for each State. 2. Proviso: Nothing in this article shall prevent the appointment of the same person as Governor for two or more States. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. Every State must have a Governor as its constitutional head — this is mandatory, not discretionary. 2. The President may appoint one person as Governor of multiple States simultaneously for administrative efficiency. 3. The Governor is appointed by the President (Art. 155), not elected — making the office a Central nominee. KEY DOCTRINE: 1. Doctrine of Pleasure — Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President (read with Art. 156). 2. Governor is a nominal/constitutional head who must act on aid and advice of the Council of Ministers (Shamsher Singh doctrine).

Constitutional Inspiration

SOURCE(S): 1. Government of India Act, 1935 — Sections 48–56 (Provincial Governors) Original provision: Provincial Governors were appointed by the British Crown and had extensive discretionary and individual judgment powers. What India kept: The office of a Governor for each State, appointed by the head of state (President replacing the Crown). 2. British Westminster Model — Constitutional monarch as nominal head Original provision: The monarch acts on ministerial advice; real executive power vests in the Cabinet. What India kept: Governor as a titular head acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Governor is appointed, not elected — Framers rejected election to keep the office above party politics and prevent Governor-CM rivalries. 2. Proviso allowing one Governor for two or more States (added by 7th Amendment, 1956) — Needed after States Reorganisation to handle smaller States and North-Eastern States efficiently. 3. No fixed security of tenure — Governor serves during the President's pleasure (unlike the fixed tenures for judges) — this was deliberate to maintain Central oversight over States in a quasi-federal setup. 4. Discretionary powers limited to specific constitutional situations — unlike the GOI Act 1935 where Governors had wide 'individual judgment' powers, India curtailed these to prevent autocratic exercise.

Constituent Assembly Debate

DEBATED ON: 30 May 1949 (CAD Volume VIII) DRAFT ARTICLE NUMBER: Draft Article 129 KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Shri Lakshmi Narain Sahu (Orissa) — Moved amendment that at least one Governor should be 'from each of the States in Part I of the First Schedule' to ensure regional representation; cited Orissa's lack of representation in central services. 2. Dr. P.S. Deshmukh — Opposed the very existence of Governors; argued provincial autonomy was only necessary during colonial rule and India needed a unitary constitution. 3. Shri Brajeshwar Prasad — Supported unitary view; argued the semi-federal structure was based on the GOI Act 1935 and state administrations had proven too unstable. 4. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar — Did not deliver a detailed reply on Art. 129 specifically; stated the matter had been debated sufficiently before. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Need for Governors at all — Some members wanted a unitary system without Governors; the majority ruled this 'out of order' as broad federal principles had already been decided. 2. Regional representation in Governorship — Sahu's amendment for at least one Governor from each State was negatived. FINAL OUTCOME: Draft Article 129 was adopted without amendment on 30 May 1949; the proviso allowing one Governor for multiple States was added later by the 7th Amendment Act, 1956. NOTE ON RELATED DEBATES: The election vs. appointment of Governors was debated on 31 May 1949 under Draft Article 131 (Art. 155). Pandit Kunzru and others debated nomination vs. election. The Assembly chose appointment by the President to keep the Governor above party politics.

Landmark Judgments

LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) — Governor is a constitutional head who must ordinarily act on aid and advice of the Council of Ministers; discretion is the exception, not the rule. 2. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — Governor's report under Art. 356 is subject to judicial review; floor test is the proper test for majority, not the Governor's subjective satisfaction; federalism is a basic feature. 3. Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006) — Governor's actions must conform to constitutional morality; discretionary powers cannot be exercised arbitrarily during political instability (Bihar Assembly dissolution case). 4. B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) — Governor's removal by the President must not be arbitrary or politically motivated; removal requires compelling reasons. 5. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025 INSC 481) — Governor cannot exercise a pocket veto or absolute veto over Bills; must act within time-bound manner under Art. 200; Court invoked Art. 142 to deem pending Bills as assented. NOTABLE DISSENTS: 1. Justice Krishna Iyer in Shamsher Singh (1974) — Delivered a powerful concurrence emphasising 'not the person but the office is important', cementing the constitutional-head doctrine. SCHOLARS & COMMISSIONS: 1. Sarkaria Commission (1988) — Governor's office is indispensable; appointment should be in consultation with State CM; Governor should be eminent, non-political, and from outside the State; full 5-year tenure should normally be allowed. 2. Punchhi Commission (2010) — Governor should have fixed 5-year tenure; removal only by impeachment-like process by State Legislature; CM must be consulted in appointment; discretionary powers under Art. 163 must be limited, reasoned, and exercised in good faith. 3. NCRWC (2002) — Appointment of Governor should be entrusted to a committee comprising PM, Home Minister, Lok Sabha Speaker, and concerned State CM.