Constitution of India
Article 146: Officers and servants and the expenses of the Supreme Court
Part V — The Union (Chapter IV — The Union Judiciary)
Clause (1) — Appointments of officers and servants
WHAT IT SAYS: 1. CJI (or any Judge/officer he directs) shall appoint officers and servants of the Supreme Court. 2. Proviso: President may by rule require UPSC consultation before appointing any person NOT already attached to the Court. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. CJI has primary and autonomous power over SC staff recruitment. 2. Executive check is limited — only for external recruits, and only via UPSC consultation (not approval). 3. Internal transfers/promotions within the Court need no UPSC involvement. KEY DOCTRINE: 1. Doctrine of Judicial Administrative Independence — the judiciary controls its own staffing, free from executive interference.
Clause (2) — Conditions of service of officers and servants
WHAT IT SAYS: 1. Subject to any law made by Parliament, conditions of service are prescribed by rules made by CJI (or authorised Judge/officer). 2. Proviso: Rules relating to salaries, allowances, leave, or pensions require the APPROVAL of the President. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. CJI has rule-making (quasi-legislative) power over SC staff service conditions. 2. Parliament has overriding legislative authority — can enact laws superseding CJI's rules. 3. Presidential approval on financial matters ensures fiscal accountability to the executive. KEY DOCTRINE: 1. Delegated Legislative Function — Article 146(2) delegates Parliament's legislative function to the CJI for SC staff service conditions.
Clause (3) — Administrative expenses charged on Consolidated Fund of India
WHAT IT SAYS: 1. All administrative expenses of the SC (salaries, allowances, pensions of officers and servants) are CHARGED upon the Consolidated Fund of India. 2. Any fees or other moneys taken by the Court form part of that Fund. WHAT IT MEANS: 1. 'Charged' = NOT subject to vote in Parliament — guaranteed, non-votable expenditure. 2. This insulates the SC from financial pressure by the executive or legislature. 3. Court revenues flow back into the Consolidated Fund — no separate judicial fund. KEY DOCTRINE: 1. Doctrine of Financial Independence of the Judiciary — judicial expenses are treated as obligatory state expenditure, akin to President's salary and CAG expenses.
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. United Kingdom — Government of India Act, 1935 (Section 221, Federal Court provisions) Original provision: The Federal Court had provisions for staff appointments under the Chief Justice with some executive oversight. What India kept: CJI's power to appoint staff and frame service rules, with limited presidential oversight on financial matters. 2. United Kingdom — British constitutional convention of judicial financial independence Original provision: UK tradition (Act of Settlement 1701 onwards) secured judicial salaries from parliamentary vote to ensure independence. What India kept: Charging SC expenses on Consolidated Fund, making them non-votable. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. CJI given DIRECT appointment power (not merely advisory) — WHY: To ensure complete administrative autonomy of the apex court in a newly independent nation. 2. Presidential 'approval' (not mere 'consultation') required for salary rules — WHY: Framers wanted fiscal discipline and uniformity across all government servants. 3. UPSC consultation for external appointees only — WHY: To prevent favouritism in outside recruitment while preserving internal flexibility. 4. Expenses 'charged' (not 'voted') on Consolidated Fund — WHY: To constitutionally guarantee financial insulation of the judiciary from political interference.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 27 May 1949 (CAD Volume VIII) Draft Article Number: 122 KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Chairman, Drafting Committee) — Moved substitution of original Article 122; stated the object was 'to make a better provision for the independence of the Supreme Court' and charge its expenses on revenues of India. 2. Members supporting the Article — One member stated Clause (1) ensured there would be 'no favouritism in the matter of appointments'. 3. A Drafting Committee member — Lauded the amendment for securing the interests of the taxpayer as well as the independence of the judiciary. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. 'Consultation' vs. 'Approval' of the President — Some members argued that requiring Presidential APPROVAL (instead of mere consultation) for salary rules infringed on judicial independence. 2. Subordination concern — One member argued it was not right to 'subordinate powers of the Supreme Court to an individual entrusted with executive powers'. 3. Defence of approval requirement — A member responded that only the executive would be fully aware of budgetary constraints of the exchequer. FINAL OUTCOME: 1. Ambedkar's substitute article was accepted with both his amendments. 2. 'Approval' of the President was retained (not mere 'consultation') for rules on salaries, allowances, leave, and pensions. 3. Clause (3) charging expenses on revenues of India was accepted without opposition. AMBEDKAR'S KEY QUOTE: 'The object of this redraft is to make a better provision for the independence of the Supreme Court and also to make provision that the administrative expenses of the Supreme Court shall be a charge on the revenues of India.'
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association v. Union of India (1989) — Held that CJI's rule-making power under Article 146(2) is legislative in nature, delegated by Parliament; CJI must frame rules with aid of own officers/judges, not necessarily via Pay Commission. 2. Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association v. Union of India (1998) — Held that revised pay rules framed by CJI under Art. 146(2) require Presidential approval; directed interim parity with Delhi HC staff pending formal approval. 3. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (1993) — While on judicial appointments (Art. 124), emphasised judicial primacy in appointments — a principle resonating with the autonomy granted under Article 146. 4. State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010) — Reiterated that judiciary's independence extends to administrative and financial domains, affirming the constitutional intent behind Articles 146 and 229. NOTABLE DISSENTS (if any): 1. Justice Thommen in SC Employees' Welfare Association (1989) — Concurred but noted that while framing rules under Article 146(2), the CJI must act on the basis of data and not arbitrarily. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. Dr. K. Sivananda Kumar (SSRN, 2020) — Observed that Article 146 confers 'absolute power of recruitment, appointment and control' of SC staff on the CJI, subject only to the proviso requiring Presidential approval on financial matters. 2. M.P. Jain — Noted Article 146 is the administrative counterpart to Article 124 (establishment) and Article 125 (judges' salaries), together forming a triad ensuring complete SC independence.