Constitution of India
Article 145: Rules of Court, etc.
Part V — The Union, Chapter IV — The Union Judiciary
Clause (1) — Rule-making power of Supreme Court
WHAT IT SAYS: Subject to any law by Parliament, the Supreme Court may, with the President's approval, make rules for regulating its practice and procedure — covering (a) persons practising before Court, (b) appeals procedure & timelines, (c) enforcement of Part III rights, (cc) proceedings under Art. 139A, (d) entertainment of criminal appeals under Art. 134(1)(c), (e) review of judgments & procedure/timelines for review, (f) costs & fees, (g) bail & stay, (h) summary dismissal of frivolous appeals, (i) procedure for inquiries under Art. 317. WHAT IT MEANS: Supreme Court enjoys autonomous rule-making power for its internal governance, but this is subject to (i) Parliamentary law, and (ii) Presidential approval — creating a balanced dual-check system. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Judicial Autonomy in Court Management — the Court is master of its own procedure, subject to constitutional limits.
Clause (2) — Minimum Judges & Bench composition
WHAT IT SAYS: Subject to Clause (3), rules under this article may fix the minimum number of judges for any purpose and provide for powers of single judges and Division Courts. WHAT IT MEANS: The Chief Justice derives constitutional authority to constitute different bench sizes — single judge, division benches, and larger benches — based on the nature of the case. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Flexibility in Bench Constitution — enables efficient case allocation while preserving judicial rigour for important matters.
Clause (3) — Constitutional Bench requirement (minimum 5 judges)
WHAT IT SAYS: Minimum 5 judges must sit for (a) deciding any case involving a substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution, or (b) hearing any reference under Art. 143. Proviso: If a bench of less than 5 hearing an appeal (other than under Art. 132) finds a substantial constitutional question, it must refer that question to a bench of 5 or more. WHAT IT MEANS: This creates the mandatory 'Constitutional Bench' — ensuring weighty constitutional questions are decided by a full complement, not a small bench. KEY DOCTRINE: Constitutional Bench Doctrine — fundamental constitutional interpretation requires collective judicial wisdom of at least 5 judges.
Clause (4) — Open Court delivery of judgments
WHAT IT SAYS: No judgment shall be delivered by the Supreme Court except in open court, and no report under Art. 143 shall be made except in accordance with an opinion also delivered in open court. WHAT IT MEANS: This mandates transparency — all SC judgments and advisory opinions must be pronounced publicly. Secret or private judgment delivery is constitutionally prohibited. KEY DOCTRINE: Principle of Open Justice — ensures public accountability of the highest judiciary.
Clause (5) — Majority concurrence & right to dissent
WHAT IT SAYS: No judgment or opinion shall be delivered save with the concurrence of a majority of judges present at hearing. However, a non-concurring judge may deliver a dissenting judgment or opinion. WHAT IT MEANS: Two key principles — (i) the binding judgment is by majority, ensuring finality; (ii) dissent is constitutionally protected, preserving alternative legal reasoning for future evolution of law. KEY DOCTRINE: Majority Rule with Protected Dissent — dissenting opinions have catalysed major legal shifts (e.g., ADM Jabalpur dissent by Justice H.R. Khanna later vindicated).
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. Government of India Act, 1935 — Section 214 (Rules of Court for Federal Court) Original provision: Federal Court could make rules for conduct of its business with the Governor-General's approval. What India kept: Replaced Governor-General with President; Federal Court with Supreme Court; added detailed sub-clauses (a)–(i) specifying rule-making areas. 2. US Constitution — Article III (Judicial Power) & US Supreme Court rule-making tradition Original provision: US Supreme Court makes its own rules of practice under Congressional authorisation. What India kept: The concept of judicial self-regulation subject to legislative override. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Mandatory 5-judge Constitutional Bench (Cl. 3) — Unique to India; ensures substantial constitutional questions get collective deliberation, given the Constitution's detailed and justiciable nature. 2. Presidential approval for rules — Borrowed from GoI Act 1935 but retained as a 'safety valve' to prevent rules imposing undue financial burden on the exchequer. 3. Explicit protection of dissent (Cl. 5) — Constitutionally entrenched right to dissent was a conscious choice to encourage open judicial discourse and jurisprudential development.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 6th June 1949 (CAD Volume VIII) Draft Article No.: 121 KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Chairman, Drafting Committee) — Defended Presidential approval as analogous to GoI Act 1935, clarified it ensured rules would not burden the exchequer; proposed amendments for open court delivery and majority concurrence. 2. Member proposing removal of Presidential approval — Argued it amounted to executive interference with the 'internal functioning' of the judiciary. 3. Member of Drafting Committee — Proposed insertion of sub-clause (bb) on review procedure, arguing it was a necessary corollary to the Court's review power. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Presidential approval vs. judicial independence — Several members supported removing the requirement; noted that High Courts did not need Governor's approval for similar rules. Ambedkar retained it as a 'safety valve'. 2. Bench composition for constitutional questions — A proviso was proposed so that a bench of less than 5 judges hearing an appeal need not waste time if only a narrow constitutional question arose — supported by the Drafting Committee. FINAL OUTCOME: Presidential approval was retained; sub-clause on review procedure was inserted; proviso to Clause (3) regarding referral by smaller benches was adopted; open court requirement and majority concurrence clauses were added. AMBEDKAR'S KEY QUOTE: He pointed out that the requirement of Presidential approval was 'analogous to existing provisions under the Government of India Act, 1935' and ensured rules did not 'impose an undue burden on the exchequer'.
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. P.N. Eswara Iyer v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India (1980) — Upheld validity of SC rule allowing review petitions to be decided by circulation (without oral hearing); held rule-making under Art. 145 is valid 'judicial legislation' but subject to Part III. 2. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) — 5-judge bench introduced 'curative petition' as a remedy after dismissal of review petition, relying on Art. 137 read with Art. 145; laid down conditions for filing curative petitions. 3. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2016) — Reaffirmed the Court's authority under Articles 145 and 146 to regulate its internal functioning and uphold institutional autonomy. 4. A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) — Held that Parliament may regulate court procedures through law, but such regulation cannot infringe judicial independence or undermine the Court's essential functions. 5. State of U.P. v. Raj Narain (1975) — Underscored the necessity of clear procedural rules to ensure transparency, fairness, and consistency in judicial proceedings. NOTABLE DISSENTS (if any): 1. Justice Kurian Joseph in Yakub Memon curative petition case — Argued the curative petition was wrongfully dismissed as it violated SC Rules 2013 requiring review by a 3-judge bench including the original judge. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer (in P.N. Eswara Iyer, 1980) — Called the rule-making power under Art. 145 a form of 'judicial legislation' geared to regulating the practice and procedure of the Court. 2. Dr. K. Sivananda Kumar (SSRN, 2020) — Observed that Art. 145 confers power on the Chief Justice to constitute benches for disposal of cases, and rules framed thereunder are valid and binding.