Constitution of India
Article 125: Salaries, etc., of Judges
Part V — The Union (Chapter IV — The Union Judiciary)
Clause (1) — Salaries of Supreme Court Judges
WHAT IT SAYS: Supreme Court judges shall be paid such salaries as Parliament may determine by law; until such law is made, salaries shall be as specified in the Second Schedule. WHAT IT MEANS: Parliament has exclusive authority to fix and revise SC judges' salaries by ordinary legislation, eliminating the need for a constitutional amendment each time. KEY DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Financial Independence of the Judiciary — salaries are charged on the Consolidated Fund of India (Art. 146), insulating judges from executive pressure. AMENDMENT HISTORY: 1. Original Clause (1) read: 'There shall be paid to the Judges of the Supreme Court such salaries as are specified in the Second Schedule.' 2. Substituted by the Constitution (54th Amendment) Act, 1986, s. 2 (w.e.f. 1-4-1986). 3. Purpose: To allow Parliament to revise salaries by law instead of requiring a constitutional amendment each time. 4. The 54th Amendment also revised Part D of the Second Schedule — CJI salary raised from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 10,000; other SC judges from Rs. 4,000 to Rs. 9,000.
Clause (2) — Privileges, Allowances, Leave, and Pension
WHAT IT SAYS: Every judge is entitled to privileges, allowances, leave of absence, and pension as determined by Parliament by law; until so determined, as specified in the Second Schedule. WHAT IT MEANS: Parliament may legislate on all service conditions of SC judges, but until it does, the Second Schedule acts as a constitutional baseline. KEY DOCTRINE: Non-Variation Clause — the Proviso guarantees that no judge's privileges, allowances, leave rights, or pension can be varied to his disadvantage after appointment. PROVISO (CRITICAL FOR UPSC): 1. Neither privileges nor allowances of a judge can be reduced after appointment. 2. Rights regarding leave of absence cannot be curtailed after appointment. 3. Pension entitlements cannot be diminished after appointment. 4. This is a constitutional safeguard against financial manipulation of sitting judges by the executive or legislature.
Constitutional Inspiration
SOURCE(S): 1. Government of India Act, 1935 — Section 221 (Salaries of Federal Court Judges) Original provision: Salaries of Federal Court judges were fixed in the Act and charged on revenues of the Federation, not subject to vote. What India kept: The principle of fixing salaries in a Schedule and charging them on the Consolidated Fund. 2. US Constitution — Article III, Section 1 (Compensation Clause) Original provision: Judicial compensation 'shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.' What India kept: The non-variation/non-diminution proviso in Clause (2). 3. British Convention — Judicial salaries protected by Act of Settlement, 1701 Original provision: Judges' salaries were made 'ascertained and established' to prevent Crown interference. What India kept: The underlying philosophy that financial security ensures judicial independence. INDIA'S SPECIFIC ADAPTATIONS: 1. Parliament given power to legislate on salaries (post-54th Amendment) — Why: Original text fixed salaries only in Second Schedule, requiring constitutional amendment for every revision, which was impractical. 2. Scope of protection broader than US model (covers privileges, allowances, leave, and pension, not just salary) — Why: Indian framers wanted comprehensive financial insulation given the historical colonial experience of executive interference with judiciary. 3. Second Schedule as interim/fallback mechanism — Why: Framers anticipated a transitional period where Parliament might not immediately legislate on judicial pay.
Constituent Assembly Debate
DEBATED ON: 30 July 1949 (CAD Volume VIII) Draft Article Number: 104 KEY SPEAKERS: 1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Chairman, Drafting Committee) — Moved an amendment to wholly replace the original Draft Article 104; defended leaving salary fixation to Parliament. 2. A member (name not specified in sources) — Proposed a proviso that pensions of SC judges should not be less than those of Federal Court judges. 3. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (in response) — Argued that the proposed pension floor was premature and presumed Federal Court salaries would remain unchanged, a decision best left to Parliament. MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS: 1. Word 'Privileges' — The original Draft Article omitted the word 'privileges'; Ambedkar's amendment added it to broaden the scope of judicial entitlements. 2. Pension Protection Floor — One member wanted a guaranteed minimum pension pegged to Federal Court judges' pensions; Ambedkar rejected this as beyond the Drafting Committee's scope. FINAL OUTCOME: Ambedkar's substitute amendment (including the word 'privileges') was accepted; the member's pension-floor proviso was negatived; the amended Draft Article was adopted on 30 July 1949. AMBEDKAR'S KEY POSITION: He held that the question of judicial salary quantum should be left to Parliament's discretion rather than being constitutionally fixed, as this allowed future flexibility while the non-variation proviso protected sitting judges.
Landmark Judgments
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: 1. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2016) — Observed that adequate and secure remuneration is essential to uphold the independence, efficiency, and dignity of the judiciary. 2. All India Judges Association v. Union of India (1993) — Held that judicial officers at all levels must receive fair compensation; parity should be with the political executive, not administrative executive. 3. All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2002) — Reiterated fair compensation for judges and directed specific improvements in service conditions of subordinate judiciary. 4. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1982) — Noted that conditions of service provisions (including Art. 125) are constitutional safeguards for judicial independence alongside fixity of tenure. NOTABLE OBSERVATIONS: 1. In the Second Judges Case (1993), the Court listed 'restriction against alteration of conditions of service to the detriment of judges after appointment' as a key safeguard for judicial independence. SCHOLARS & JURISTS: 1. M.P. Jain — Viewed Article 125 as a pillar of judicial independence, ensuring financial insulation of judges from executive control. 2. D.D. Basu — Noted that the non-variation clause in Art. 125(2) proviso is modelled on the compensation clause of the US Constitution but is broader in scope.